US Navy destroyer collision

[Snowpetrel]

Originally Posted by Bigjim

Considering where the collision occurred (starboard side) the US ship was burdened. BUT, that also means the merchant was required to maintain course and speed. There are reports that the container ship changed course radically before the collision. I don't know if that is true.

Most of these reports came from the fact that the reported collision time was incorrect. It now seems the container ship made a slight alteration to port to stay in the voluntary TSS.

Originally Posted by hpeer

I would like to add a fourth suggestion.
That naval officers and others standing bridge watch be assigned to an observer position on a commercial vessel for some period. Maybe to tug duty in NY or Longbeach. Maybe as a ghost for a Pilot. You get the idea, walk in the other guys shoes.

This would be a great idea. I guess one problem is the lack of foreign going US merchant ships?

[TwoBlocked]

Originally Posted by redsky49

While a long time sailor, I have no big ship experience, nor US Navy experience (other than being hailed years ago by "Navy Warship" that scared the cr*p out of me while in the Atlantic), yet several issues till stand out:

1. Do the current class destroyers show clearly on typical commercial radars, and display commensurate with their size?
2. Why was the Captain not on the bridge during transit of such a problematic area?
3. Why was the Captain not summoned prior to collision? He was never notified?
4. Why was General Quarters or Collision Warning never sounded prior to collision? Was the Navy's first indication of trouble the sound of rending metal???
5. Along with the AIS disabled, was the Navy vessel also not displaying running lights?
6. If the OOD is nominally in charge of the bridge, what are his/her qualifications and/or experience?

There still seems to be much yet to be learned here. In the meantime, my respect and condolences to the families of the lost sailors.

Pretty much the same question could be asked about the ACX Crystal, but aren't. Not even from those that are suggesting that the Navy's bridge keeping is second rate to the Merchant Marine's. Doesn't seem fair especially considering that most agree that the ACX Crystal was the Give-Way vessel because it was overtaking the USS Fitzgerald.

Doesn't seem very fair!

[estarzinger]

Two- Blocked . . . Didn't your daddy teach you life is not fair

Actually the reason those questions are not being generally asked about the container ship is that we generally have a feel and understanding for the failure there. Low manning levels, autopilot on, no ais and small radar signature from destroyer, etc. But most of us don't have the same feel and understand about how the failure happened on Navy - who had full manning, all the gear and technology they could want, a target displaying ais and a huge radar signature etc etc.

Btw unless you know something which is not public . . . We do not know which vessel was stand on . . . Could have been either from the public information, and there has been speculation both ways.

1. Do the current class destroyers show clearly on typical commercial radars, and display commensurate with their size?

They have approximately 1/50 the radar signature expected for their size, but they should still show clearly on a clear calm night.

2. Why was the Captain not on the bridge during transit of such a problematic area?

Probably because he thought the xo couple handle it.

3. Why was the Captain not summoned prior to collision? He was never notified?

Probably because they never saw the container ship.

4. Why was General Quarters or Collision Warning never sounded prior to collision? Was the Navy's first indication of trouble the sound of rending metal???

Apparently yes, first they knew was the hit - which is hard to believe but seems the only explanation. I will be curious to hear if navy comes up with another explanation.

5. Along with the AIS disabled, was the Navy vessel also not displaying running lights?

We do not know.

6. If the OOD is nominally in charge of the bridge, what are his/her qualifications and/or experience.

There is significant training, tests and deck time. Generally pretty competent fellow.

[TwoBlocked]

Originally Posted by donradcliffe

I would not be surprised if one of the root causes of this accident is over-reliance on electronic devices, yet the recommendations are for even more electronics. I haven't read any reports on the Porter incident, but the minesweeper in Indonesia disregarded the lookout's report of a 'flashing light' and followed their chartplotter onto the reef--the flashing light was a lighthouse.

I think that an honest investigation will point out a 'failure to look out the window' and fatigue as major causes. It was interesting to hear that most of the ex-navy guys remarked on how tired they were from all the drills, whereas civilian watchkeepers have required rest periods.

I think it is a matter of correctly interpreting what you see whether it is visual or electronic. The Andrea Doria and Stockholm was a radar assisted collision. The USCGC Cayahoga misinterpreted both the visual and radar info and sank in the resulting collision with 11 loosing their lives. Then there is the USCGC Blackthorn. An officer on that ship notified the Captain that there was no danger of collision after observing the bearing of the Capricorn changing ONE DEGREE! 23 lives were lost.

It's not as much what you are looking at as it is your understanding of what you are looking at. There is also knowing your limitations...

[TwoBlocked]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

Two- Blocked . . . Didn't your daddy teach you life is not fair

Actually the reason those questions are not being generally asked about the container ship is that we generally have a feel and understanding for the failure there. Low manning levels, autopilot on, no ais and small radar signature from destroyer, etc. But most of us don't have the same feel and understand about how the failure happened on Navy - who had full manning, all the gear and technology they could want, a target displaying ais and a huge radar signature etc etc.

Btw unless you know something which is not public . . . We do not know which vessel was stand on . . . Could have been either from the public information, and there has been speculation both ways.

Thanks for the reply.

I will bet a silver dollar that EITHER vessel could have avoided having a collision if they had been attentive, and capable, which they both probably are almost all the time. But when it is the case when two vessels are on a collision course...

[Auspicious]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

Actually the reason those questions are not being generally asked about the container ship is that we generally have a feel and understanding for the failure there. Low manning levels, autopilot on, no ais and small radar signature from destroyer, etc.

Evans,

I don't usually reply to your posts because I agree with them.

There is an implication in this statement that I take issue with.

Low manning levels on commercial ships are an unfortunate reality.

The policy of the US Navy not to transmit AIS as a default does have an adverse safety impact.

The design of warships to minimize radar cross section supports their mission but does make tracking them more difficult.

However, the implication that using an autopilot is bad or might otherwise have contributed to the collision is one I disagree with. An autopilot is a net contributor to safety on a large commercial ship just as it is on a similarly shorthanded recreational boat. It frees up attention for other tasks most importantly including situational awareness. That situational awareness was not maintained does not reflect on the positive value of an autopilot.

I have steered a large(ish) ship - a 30,000 LT 600' oil tanker. It's a job that takes tremendous attention. There aren't many brain cycles left for anything else. On a lightly manned bridge an autopilot is a God-send. Not to use it would be irresponsible.

sail fast and eat well, dave

[hpeer]

I think I said it before but I'll repeat...... studies indicate that you have a better chance of being helped if found by ONE person rather than a few. If there is one person then they know that they must act if you are to be helped. When there are a few often everyone assumes someone else is better qualified now and is going to do the right thing.

My gut tells me that is what happened here. It's likely that someone on the Fitz knew there was a problem but waited for someone else to make the call. You know, when a committee is in charge no one is in charge. Sure the OOD is in charge, if the ship, but it sounds like he may not be in charge of the FACTS. He is reliant upon underlings bring up the relevant info. If he is an intimidating personality facts may be squelched. Or he may be a leader who is scatter brained, unable to sort the plethora of information.

If the lowly watch stander does not have permission to say "Yo dude, we're gonna hit that ship!" or if he does and is ignored, then the system is broken.

So that's my guess, it's a problem of too many resources. The integration needs to take place in the OOD's and Helmsmans minds, not in some electronics. Sometimes flat organizations just work better.

Anyway, that's just my guess. Dilution of responsibility through the crew.

Commercial vessels may have the opposite problem, too few team members. And now some are pushing unmanned vessels. I wonder how that's gonna work!

We will eventually see what the Navy says.

[estarzinger]

Originally Posted by TwoBlocked

I will bet a silver dollar that EITHER vessel could have avoided having a collision if they had been attentive, and capable, which they both probably are almost all the time

Yes, sure, I agree totally with all parts of that statement.

Originally Posted by Auspicious

However, the implication that using an autopilot is bad or might otherwise have contributed to the collision is one I disagree with. An autopilot is a net contributor to safety on a large commercial ship just as it is on a similarly shorthanded recreational boat. It frees up attention for other tasks most importantly including situational awareness . That situational awareness was not maintained does not reflect on the positive value of an autopilot.

I agree that with current real manning levels the use of the autopilot is a necessity and a "God-Send" on the container ship.

I also agree that in theory it frees up time which could be dedicated to improved situational awareness.

But where we may diverge is that time may also not be used to improve situational awareness but used to do paperwork or watch porn, and decrease situational awareness. I dont know what the Crystal bridge crew was doing but I guess they were not looking at their radar very closely/frequently or out the windows.

On yachts with reasonable crew size (4 or more) I think there is a clear case to be made that in actual practice those with a human helm have systematically more situational awareness than those running autopilot - consider the Aegean incident just as one example (but beyond that example, among the incidents I have studied statistically those under autopilot run into **** rather more frequently than those with human helm - this includes not just hitting stuff but not being aware the wind is building or the boat unbalanced or something making a funny noise in the rigging, etc). Some folks, like you may well invest that extra time wisely, but a lot do not.

But again on a yacht, if you have low manning (single or doublehanded for instance) you pretty much have to run the autopilot, and to not do so would decrease your total functioning.

So, I personally consider the autopilot a negative on seamanship and situational awareness, but one essentially forced by manning levels.

On the flip side, that autopilot track should have made the Crystal's course very predictable to Navy - straight line except for totally expected navigational/TSS turn points.

[TwoBlocked]

Originally Posted by hpeer

I think I said it before but I'll repeat...... studies indicate that you have a better chance of being helped if found by ONE person rather than a few. If there is one person then they know that they must act if you are to be helped. When there are a few often everyone assumes someone else is better qualified now and is going to do the right thing.

My gut tells me that is what happened here. It's likely that someone on the Fitz knew there was a problem but waited for someone else to make the call. You know, when a committee is in charge no one is in charge. Sure the OOD is in charge, if the ship, but it sounds like he may not be in charge of the FACTS. He is reliant upon underlings bring up the relevant info. If he is an intimidating personality facts may be squelched. Or he may be a leader who is scatter brained, unable to sort the plethora of information.

If the lowly watch stander does not have permission to say "Yo dude, we're gonna hit that ship!" or if he does and is ignored, then the system is broken.

So that's my guess, it's a problem of too many resources. The integration needs to take place in the OOD's and Helmsmans minds, not in some electronics. Sometimes flat organizations just work better.

Anyway, that's just my guess. Dilution of responsibility through the crew.

Commercial vessels may have the opposite problem, too few team members. And now some are pushing unmanned vessels. I wonder how that's gonna work!

We will eventually see what the Navy says.

You make a good point about "shared responsibility" that I agree with, although I doubt it happened in this case. I think this situation was a long time in brewing and came as a surprise. Like "How did that ship get here? Just a minute ago (more like 10 minutes...) it was way over there!"

A few decades ago "Bridge Team Management" was a new required credential. I tried to keep an open mind, but I found the ideas and cherry-picked scenarios to be outrageous. This was at a Union School with a 360 degree simulator. They tried to convince us that we would do better if everyone on the bridge was assigned a particular job, and if we each payed attention to our part and performed as a "team" we could do more than any of us could on our own. There was one mate I thought quite a bit of that agreed with this idea. He had also been a Navy aviator and described how the one man show in fighter jets was not what the commercial airlines wanted. They wanted the pilot and copilot to work together as a team. I asked how many it took to land a plane and he replied just one, of course. I then pointed out that if it required two, then there would be THREE pilots on board.

Anyhoo, every single scenario in the simulator was within pilotage waters. We all took turns being Captain and assigned who we wished to be on the helm, on radar, plotting, radio, etc. (Sound like the Navy?) And for what they expected, it WAS necessary. There was no time given to study the charts and Coast Pilot ahead of time, determine where VTS call in points were, get truly familiar with the bridge equipment or even with each other. Not to mention that if we were in these scenarios for REAL we would lose our licenses for not taking a pilot on board as was required!

Some scenarios went better than others. When things didn't go well, it was because the Captain lost "situational awareness" (which is VERY difficult to be aware of...) even when some other bridge team member pointed out pertinent facts, or some bridge team member just missed something important, dropped the ball so to speak, and nobody, including the Captain had the whole picture as to put the missing pieces together.

Well expect for one scenario, of course ... I refused to play the game their way. If I was to be Captain of a ship coming into a port without a pilot, I would do my homework ahead of time, or when the simulation began I would execute a 180 and go anchor. THAT would be the actions of a prudent mariner, which was contrary to what this flavor of bridge team management was about. What it was about was a self fulfilling prophecy using the simulator as a self-promotion tool.

And so I was allowed to sit down after class with the charts and pubs and make notes on 3x5 cards, just as I always did whether we were taking a pilot or not. (I had served on smaller vessels that did not require having a pilot and often had to go into unfamiliar port without one.) Regardless of what they threw at us, including gyro failures, erratic boats, distracting phone calls from the crew, and an aground vessel blocking half the channel just before a turn, (but the USCG didn't restrict navigation in the port...) we just continued up the channel because the Captain himself (me) knew where he was and what was coming up.

But is there a time when we really need to divide up the jobs? Well, yes, but not during a normal transit. Such times are known ahead of time and planned out. A particular situation I became very familiar with was working aids to navigation in the USCG. Retrieving and setting those buoys right next to shoal water took some real teamwork. Even so, mistakes were made. The worse logbook entry I ever had to make was "Aground as before." at the beginning of a new watch. It was a situation where the Cutter's Navigational Officer did not share the information that the channel we were working had shifted. Once again, nobody had the whole picture.

[fjwiley1]

Originally Posted by UNCIVILIZED

To be fair, he was found hiding in the engine room. Probably with help, along with a decent amount of prior planning & prep. Read stores of food, water, etc. Though as to the why ???

Not sure about today's Navy but back in the 60's if you borrowed "Slush Fund" money or owed "Gambling" debt monies you paid your debt aboard ship.

If you didn't then, well let's just say all debts got paid in full...

[Snowpetrel]

^^ Sounds like it wasn't the best run BRM course. And older experainced Captains would be hard to teach at the best of times!

Most of the BRM principles were well done on the P&O ships in the 90's. With the exception of the Challenge and response part. Back in those days the Captain was king, and no junior officer would be taken serously if they challenged the Captain. I still think this is an area where merchant shipping is weak. I am not sure what navy culture is like in this regard?

I remember once as a Cadet doing regular position fixes during a port entry, we appeared to be set towards the shoals so I approached the captain and pilot and tried to get a word in about this. They both ignored me, and when I spoke up I was rudely brushed away as they went back to their discussion about something non ship related. We didn't run aground, but I still think we were closer to the shoal than the captain or pilot released.

I was annoyed to be brushed off, and didn't bother him again. In retrospect this was definately a breakdown in BRM. Something like the five step assertive statement, or the two challenge rule should have been part of the bridge proceedures. I'd like to think things have got better, but I am not sure if this is the case. Eg El Faro and the way the captain ignored the junior officers justified concerns about the weather forcast.

[redsky49]

Originally Posted by TwoBlocked

Pretty much the same question could be asked about the ACX Crystal, but aren't. Not even from those that are suggesting that the Navy's bridge keeping is second rate to the Merchant Marine's. Doesn't seem fair especially considering that most agree that the ACX Crystal was the Give-Way vessel because it was overtaking the USS Fitzgerald.

Doesn't seem very fair!

Oh, I certainly have questions for them (ACX Crystal) as well. However, I am assuming they were displaying running lights. They were broadcasting their AIS signals (confirmed by Maritime tracking), so that is a fact in this investigation. So those issues are settled unless disputed by future evidence.

I suspect that the container ship will have some sort of "black box" recording device, and that it will be made public far sooner than the US Navy and its corresponding device, if any.

But you do have a point in that I hold the US Navy to a high(er) standard than the commercial mariner, both for obvious reasons and the fact that I am a US citizen. I don't think that this is unreasonable of me.

I still maintain an open mind as to fault, though I suspect that any conclusive findings as to responsibility will be many months away, if ever.

[Snowpetrel]

http://www.maritime-executive.com/ed...st-blame-later

An interesting article, such as invoking rule 8f, that as far as I can see bears no relevance to this case. Also the possibility that the bridge was unmanned because the OOW was waking their relief. It is a possibility but on every merchant vessel I have sailed on its done via the ships telephone system.

I think the fact that no details have been released about the course of the fitzgerald and the CS is pretty damning. By now they should have all the basic facts confirmed. If the containership was the give way vessel they would almost certainly officially released this information.

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by Snowpetrel

http://www.maritime-executive.com/ed...st-blame-later

An interesting article, such as invoking rule 8f, that as far as I can see bears no relevance to this case. Also the possibility that the bridge was unmanned because the OOW was waking their relief. It is a possibility but on every merchant vessel I have sailed on its done via the ships telephone system.

I think the fact that no details have been released about the course of the fitzgerald and the CS is pretty damning. By now they should have all the basic facts confirmed. If the containership was the give way vessel they would almost certainly officially released this information.

I agree Snow petrel,

To me, that article is a condescending load of bollocks!

Telling us mere civilians that we are somehow unpatriotic by asking basic questions about why they will not release ....Or Allow the Japanease Marine Authority...to release the recorded track of the Fitz?

Pure spin to confuse and control the Masses as commercial Masters do not need to be lectured on COLREGS and rule 8f.

I am afraid the only word that comes to mind about this lack of equal transparency is..
Arrogance!

[Auspicious]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

I also agree that in theory it frees up time which could be dedicated to improved situational awareness.

But where we may diverge is that time may also not be used to improve situational awareness but used to do paperwork or watch porn, and decrease situational awareness.

Many inherently good things can be misused or their proper use not understand. Down that path lies Jeff Siegel's conclusion that paper charts are dangerous.

I agree with you that autopilots are subject to misuse just as I agree with Jeff that many modern boaters need the many props of electronics and don't have the skills for piloting and navigation on paper. That doesn't make autopilots or paper are inherently bad.

The appropriate issue with regard to the Fitzgerald collision is whether the bridge watch on the ACX Crystal was paying attention, maintaining situational awareness, and using the tools available to them -- not whether the autopilot was on or not.

My position is entirely self-serving. I use the autopilot pretty much all the time except when docking. *grin*

Originally Posted by estarzinger

On yachts with reasonable crew size (4 or more) I think there is a clear case to be made that in actual practice those with a human helm have systematically more situational awareness than those running autopilot

My experience is that a solo watch handsteering tends to wander on their course substantially especially during the after part of a horizon scan. Most people just aren't very good at it, and with some exceptions (Hank Schmitt comes to mind) performance deteriorates well before the end of a four hour watch.

Originally Posted by estarzinger

- this includes not just hitting stuff but not being aware the wind is building or the boat unbalanced or something making a funny noise in the rigging, etc). Some folks, like you may well invest that extra time wisely, but a lot do not.

I appreciate that you put me in that category; I do believe I do. I also coach my crews to do the same. Some admittedly do much better than others. I won't digress to the relative merits of judgment and skills in crew, although that too may be relevant to the Fitzgerald collision.

If the autopilot loading up wakes me up and the watch hasn't noticed we'll have a long and patient discussion. I want the crew who wake me up because they see, hear, or feel something and aren't sure what to do. Those people will sail with me again.

Originally Posted by estarzinger

So, I personally consider the autopilot a negative on seamanship and situational awareness, but one essentially forced by manning levels.

I do see your point. I just don't agree with it. *grin*

sail fast and eat well, dave