US Navy destroyer collision

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

^^

I looked at my chart and there are no lane buoy's shown, but the traffic lanes are shown on the chart - labeled as 'separation scheme voluntary'.

So, yes, it is clear that this is a 'legally optional' scheme . . . . but the fact it is there and marked on the chart and outlined in the pilot, basically . . . . It means that the crystal's course was in fact pretty predictable, and Navy should have been paying attention.

#1 navy should have know to expect traffic to make that port turn,
#2 navy should have known where to look closely (to starboard) for on coming traffic,
#3 navy watch keepers and bridge and CiC to be paying (extra) attention when crossing TSS lanes even voluntary ones.

It just adds a bit more to the puzzle of why this happened to navy - this is a spot exactly marked on charts and pilot where you wanted to pay extra attention and you (should have) knew where to look.

Hi Evans, you can also add one more factor, the Japanese traffic control system is very detailed and does emphasize the Visual.

Every commercial vessel is equipped with a tree of different color lights flashing (day/night) to indicate their destination and intent.

Marine Traffic throughout Japan is incredibly busy and dense with a myriad of crossing destinations, strong currents and many connecting channels to choose from.

If you Google under Japanese Maritime Authority you will find an English detailed PDF..." For the Safety Navigation in Japanese Coastal Waters" which starts by making a graphic statistic of accidents with Foreign Vessels.

All the coastal freighters do exactly 12 knots and meld in and out of the main streams with specific flashing Letter signals (Morse) to indicate their destination..
Impressive bit of organization!

It is the reason they are very restrictive in allowing large foreign super yachts to travel freely through the country.

On a 52m superyacht Cruising between Osaka and Kagoshima on a regular basis, it took me initially 5 days of negotiations with JMA to prove my understanding of their signal lights and provide them ahead of time with a detailed anchorage plan for every tourist destination and every spot of our first 6 week cruise.

Luckily the Kansai Yacht Club and Customs agreed to update JMA on any deviation of our plan, but it was a red tape nightmare!

Basically the Japanese don't think we foreigners can understand and safely navigate their waters that are their lifeblood of fishing and commerce.... so this tragic event doesn't help.

[Snowpetrel]

Originally Posted by Bigjim

I served aboard a WWII era destroyer in the 70s and we would have never been that close to any merchantman. Most merchantmen we encountered had skeleton crews standing watch at any time, maybe 2-5 at most. At night, it would probably be lower. And, these crew members would often have several jobs to do offering various levels of distraction.

On a navy ship we would have 2 officers, 2 helmsmen, a navigator, a Boatswains mate and probably 3 lookouts with binoculars. Then there would be another 3-5 watch standers in CIC monitoring radar and radio traffic. Only once in four years did we have to change course to avoid a merchantman. Basically, they often set their autopilot and steam ahead regardless of other traffic. We had the right-of-way but we maneuvered well in advance once we realized he was not going to alter course.

Interesting. I dont consider the typical merchant ship manning to be a skeleton crew, or undermanned at sea. For what its worth we usually only had the OOW on the bridge during the day, at night a lookout would be posted. During the day the lookout was on call, and on the bridge in heavy traffic or poor vis. Due to the layout of the bridge with radars, chart table and radios easily to hand it was normally pretty easy for one watch officer to manage, even in heavy traffic.

Arrival in and out of port we would have a few more hands on the bridge. Two crew as lookout/helmsman alternating half hour shifts, the old man, the OOW navigating and sometimes a cadet and pilot. So 5 crew max + a pilot. The bridge was always a quiet place, no music, no chatter. Only helm and engine orders were loudly spoken. Everything else was softly spoken and kept to a minimum. We weren't even allowed to sit! The coasters were a bit more relaxed.

The old man was always on call, but they gave us plenty of freedom within the standing and night orders to do what needed to be done. Normal CPA 2 nm but they would reduce this to 1nm in heavy traffic, otherwise they got no sleep.

Occasionally I would have a cadet posted to my watch. Sometimes very usefull, sometimes not..

Whilst we are normally on Autopilot we, and most of the merchant ships I encountered were pretty active at avoiding collision. It certainty wasn't ever a case of AP on and nobody on the bridge.

I wonder what the bridge layout of these destroyers is? I hear about this CIC. Is it separate from the bridge. If so does the bridge have its own radar and nav station, Or is the OOD having to walk from one room to another to get the information visually?

[estarzinger]

CiC is several decks below the bridge. (3 I believe).
Yes bridge has its own nav displays.

It is just below the "armored trunk" in this drawing

[Auspicious]

Originally Posted by Snowpetrel

Occasionally I would have a cadet posted to my watch. Sometimes very usefull, sometimes not..

I was one of those. *grin* Back in Loran A days pulling the time delays off the receiver and plotting positions, helping with lookout, recommending course changes, and drills from the Captain. Then the CE found out I could weld and *bam* I was in engineering.

Originally Posted by Snowpetrel

I wonder what the bridge layout of these destroyers is? I hear about this CIC. Is it separate from the bridge. If so does the bridge have its own radar and nav station, Or is the OOD having to walk from one room to another to get the information visually?

The CIC is down in the ship. There are displays on the bridge that repeat some of what is in CIC and a direct line between the two. Nav radars are displayed on the bridge and repeated in CIC. Weapons radars are in CIC and some are repeated to the bridge. There is an integrated electronic plotting board that is accessible in both places.

It sounds more complicated than it is.

[estarzinger]

bridge photos




the CiC is all dark and just jammed with screens

[senormechanico]

Originally Posted by TwoBlocked

Thanks for the additional info!

I recall being outbound in the Straits of Juan de Fuca, following the TSS. A sub was slowly overtaking us. They called and asked what my intentions were. I replied to maintain course and speed and remain within the TSS. A few minutes went by and the exact same request was made with the exact same reply. As I expected, a few minutes later the sub submerged...

The incident told me that the sub did not fully understand the Rules of the Road nor the requirements of that TSS. Unless a specific agreement was made, I was required to maintain course and speed. I sure wasn't going to try to second guess or even ask what their intentions were. It was up to THEM to propose some kind of passage, which I would have been happy to do. Instead, they chose to leave the TSS, or at least the surface of it, violating the spirit of it being a way for vessels to more safely navigate. Seems they were above (or in this case below?) that sort of thing...

But that might not have been the case here.

Maybe they just waited for enough depth....

(a former submariner)

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by TwoBlocked

Thanks for the additional info!

I recall being outbound in the Straits of Juan de Fuca, following the TSS. A sub was slowly overtaking us. They called and asked what my intentions were. I replied to maintain course and speed and remain within the TSS. A few minutes went by and the exact same request was made with the exact same reply. As I expected, a few minutes later the sub submerged...

The incident told me that the sub did not fully understand the Rules of the Road nor the requirements of that TSS. Unless a specific agreement was made, I was required to maintain course and speed. I sure wasn't going to try to second guess or even ask what their intentions were. It was up to THEM to propose some kind of passage, which I would have been happy to do. Instead, they chose to leave the TSS, or at least the surface of it, violating the spirit of it being a way for vessels to more safely navigate. Seems they were above (or in this case below?) that sort of thing...

But that might not have been the case here.

What type of vessel were you on?

Subs are wary of large tug and tows if for some maneuvering reason the steel tow cable goes slack

[TwoBlocked]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

What type of vessel were you on?

Subs are wary of large tug and tows if for some maneuvering reason the steel tow cable goes slack

Gosh, I can't quite remember. Probably was in the days I was doing seismic survey, so it would have been something around 250 feet long. I've been on a WIDE variety of ships. All tug work was on the East coast.

[Randy]

There is some acknowledgement in US Navy circles that improvements​ need to be made no matter what the investigation concludes evidenced​ by the story in this link.
https://blog.usni.org/posts/tag/surface-warfare

[Snowpetrel]

^^Thats a very interesting article. ARPA training would be a great start, there being lots of traps to ARPA for the unwary. And overlayed AIS, ARPA and ECDIS data.

Thanks for the info on the CIC and the bridge pictures. Its all very different to our spacious and airy merchant fleet bridges.

[Dockhead]

Originally Posted by Snowpetrel

^^Thats a very interesting article. ARPA training would be a great start, there being lots of traps to ARPA for the unwary. And overlayed AIS, ARPA and ECDIS data.

Thanks for the info on the CIC and the bridge pictures. Its all very different to our spacious and airy merchant fleet bridges.

This is interesting :

"Second, the commanding officer, executive offier, and all officers and chiefs standing bridge watch should be required to complete an automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) course instead of merely the job qualification requirement or performance qualification system associated with the system aboard their ship."

So they don't get general training in using ARPA systems?

What about radar plotting and collision avoidance?

[Randy]

Originally Posted by Dockhead

This is interesting :

"Second, the commanding officer, executive offier, and all officers and chiefs standing bridge watch should be required to complete an automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) course instead of merely the job qualification requirement or performance qualification system associated with the system aboard their ship."

So they don't get general training in using ARPA systems?

What about radar plotting and collision avoidance?

On the job Navy training is called PQS. No matter, the training in a commercial setting in 70 hrs or shipboard is only an orientation the quality of which is extremely variable I think in either setting.
It takes a lot of watches in multiple traffic environments​ to be able to see and resolve traffic issues before they develop into problems or because of inattention deadly accidents.
Neither vessel brought enough resources (experience) onto the bridge in time to prevent the collision.

[estarzinger]

Originally Posted by Snowpetrel

Thanks for the info on the CIC and the bridge pictures. Its all very different to our spacious and airy merchant fleet bridges.

Agreed, The bridge looks cluttered and not very "user friendly" or "work flow friendly" to me.

The CiC looks like it had a ton more design time and user feedback.

[estarzinger]

Originally Posted by Randy

Neither vessel brought enough resources (experience) onto the bridge in time to prevent the collision.

Mmmm . . . . I would not suggest that navy's problem is a lack of resources.

Would be interesting to see the sea logs of all the sailors on the bridge and CiC at the time. But I suspect they had some (the usual mix of) experience on hand.

And I would not blame this on a "couple bad apples.

Nor would this incident require "rocket science" (advanced training or experience of any kind) to avoid. It was collision avoidance at its very very most basics - one inexperienced but alert watch keeper with his bare eyeballs and one helmsman with little sea time should have avoided it.

When a dozen people with the most modern survalance equipment and high agility/manouverability in clear and calm conditions can't stay out of the way of a container ship on autopilot (e.g. Steering a completely predictable course, transmitting ais, with a huge radar profile), combined with the porter and other lessor incidents . . . IMHO there is a much more fundamental problem at work - the process is broken.

[estarzinger]

If Navy wants other vessels to "see and maneuver to avoid them", then they do need to transmit AiS. It has just become the basic standard tool in use - you not transmitting you pretty much invisible today.

As Dock said up thread, Navy's prior posture was that navy wanted to be the one to maneuver, and they did not really need or even want other ships to do so. But that of course assumes they can keep a competent watch and situational awareness (which they 'should' be able to do, but seem to have trouble in actual practice).

ARPA, screw that, that's generation old tech, they need (seriously I mean this) AI that tracks the targets. It would be dead easy tech to build, and not go asleep or lose concentration. Building colregs into ai would be child's play . . . . airforce ai can now beat the very best human top gun pilot in dogfights 99% of the time.