USNavy Report on Fitzgerald Collision.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by Breaking Waves

I dont see any reason to debate this . . . .

Fair enough - you mentioned a Japanese Coast Guard report - have you seen this?

[requiem]

To me the TSS status is still somewhat indeterminate. The Japanese report shows it on a chart (p22) which corresponds to that shown in the NGA Sailing Directions (p86). The collision site appears east of the zone, but the spot marked on the Japanese report seems a bit too far south. In any case, it seems that the early course changes were not considered as problematic, perhaps because the narrative timeline has them being made before the ships had observed each other.

The Japanese report has a sequence of radar screens from vessel D, which I believe is the Wan Hai 266. It mentions that the radar on Fitzgerald was not adjusted: Crystal kept dropping off, then was harder to track due to clutter. (The NTSB report mentions that the OOD was having difficulty acquiring the radar contacts via ARPA.)

I noticed that the radar image from the Crystal also seemed to have a clutter problem. Given the reported sea state I would have expected them to be better adjusted. The images from the Wan Hai 266 appear quite clean.

Also interesting is Vessel C in the Japanese report, which apparently Fitzgerald crossed ahead of by about 1600-1700 yards a half hour earlier. Perhaps there's a local tradition of using the signalling lights?

• At around 00:26 on 17th, officer C took over watch off Izu Peninsula and altered the course from 078° to 040° by autopilot at a way point off Mikomotoshima lighthouse.
• At around 00:32, officer C, after altering the course, saw a port light of Vessel B right ahead recognizing it to be a meeting vessel and turned to starboard to make the course 068° in order to go in a manner of port versus port.
• Officer C thought that Vessel B would be a warship due to the small interval of masthead lights when Vessel B approached at the distance of about 5M.
• At around 00:43, when officer C turned to port to bring back the course to the scheduled course of 040°, Vessel B started to turn to port and therefore, at around 00:52, officer C emitted a search light seven times, but was not able to see reactions from Vessel B.
• Vessel C turned to starboard for avoiding Vessel B, but Vessel B continued to turn to port and therefore officer C emitted the search light seven times again.
• At around 01:09, Vessel C was in the closest point of about 0.6 to 0.7M to Vessel B in a manner of starboard versus starboard.
• Officer C found in the moonlight that the meeting vessel was a warship

[Pelagic]

Quote
Perhaps there's a local tradition of using the signalling lights?
Unquote

There is, very effective, especially in the Setonaikai with many crossing and joining situations.

[Pelagic]

The Report's Probable Cause really says it all!

When I look at the tracks I can tell that the Fitz Watchkeep was using speed, not seamanship to cross this convoy of cargo ships

Fitz track shows them SOG 19.1
01:18 speeds up upon approaching ships
01:24 small indistinguishable course change to pass in front of Wan Hai at a reduced CPA
01:27 to 01 :30 CONTINUES TO INCREASE SPEED to 19.7kt at point of Collision.

Both Crystalline and Wan Hai made the same planned course change about 3 minutes apart to steer the same NE course as was the Maersk Evora.

All of this convoy action would be pretty apparent to a commercial watch keeper piloting Fitz.

Sensible action
Maintain course till well clear of Wan, then make a Substantial and Readily Apparent.change to Starboard at 1nm CPA of Wan, to pass safely astern of Crystal in a Red to Red Aspect

Seamanship is also about making life easy for the other watch keepers, not about being a cowboy wrangling amongst cattle

NTSB REPORT SUMMARY

Probable Cause

In the report, the NTSB stated the probable cause as the Fitzgerald’s bridge team’s failure to take early and substantial action to avoid collision as the give-way vessel in a crossing situation. Also contributing was the ineffective communication and cooperation among the crew on the Fitzgerald’s bridge and combat information center, coupled with the commanding officer’s insufficient planning for the hazards of the destroyer’s intended transit.

[Dockhead]

This is the radar picture referred to in several posts:





You can see Crystal's radar was badly tuned. Nevertheless, Fitz shows up clearly. What radar operator would leave the screen in that condition. I think they weren't watching it.

[Pete7]

Originally Posted by Dockhead

Crystal bridge were obviously not watching the radar at all, and that is seriously egregious.

I would suggest the Friz Command Center, whilst not part of the bridge or responsible safe navigation, were also asleep. How can a target approach a US warship at 20 knots and not be noticed Or Junior Officers expected to teach themselves collregs by watching 20 DVDs in their own time whilst standing watches and doing everything else YOs are expected to do.

[Dockhead]

Originally Posted by Pete7

I would suggest the Friz Command Center, whilst not part of the bridge or responsible safe navigation, were also asleep. How can a target approach a US warship at 20 knots and not be noticed Or Junior Officers expected to teach themselves collregs by watching 20 DVDs in their own time whilst standing watches and doing everything else YOs are expected to do.

I've said it before, but what happened on Fitz just beggars belief. That kind of warship has 10x the resources of a ship like Crystal, a whole team of people specifically trained to manage a multitude of potentially hostile targets and all kinds of tools for that. If they can't even manage to stay out of the way of two lumbering cargo ships, how can we expect them to manage a flock of Iranian gunboats?



Methinks we have a much bigger problem than just COLREGs.

[Pete7]

Indeed which is why the Pacific Fleet Comdr lost his job early on in the investigation. Too much pressure on crews under trained and overwhelmed which very sadly took the lives of 7 USN before action was taken.

The only good thing to come out of this is other Navies have taken a critical look at their fleets.

Pete

[El Pinguino]

Originally Posted by Pete7

Indeed which is why the Pacific Fleet Comdr lost his job early on in the investigation. Too much pressure on crews under trained and overwhelmed which very sadly took the lives of 7 USN before action was taken.

The only good thing to come out of this is other Navies have taken a critical look at their fleets.

Pete

Pity the Norwegians just weren't quite quick enough.....

[Dockhead]

Originally Posted by Pete7

Indeed which is why the Pacific Fleet Comdr lost his job early on in the investigation. Too much pressure on crews under trained and overwhelmed which very sadly took the lives of 7 USN before action was taken.

The only good thing to come out of this is other Navies have taken a critical look at their fleets.

Pete

Pressure on crews? Seems to me like much, much worse than that -- like sheer and utter unfitness. Would you trust a bridge which can't even stay out of the way of a cargo ship, to fight hostile warships? I wouldn't. Handling a ship competently in battle is the same kind of challenge, only 1000x more complex and difficult.



That's untold billions flushed down the toilet. The entire doctrine and system needs to be audited; and probably a whole lot more heads need to roll, than that one. One guy can't create a screwup of that magnitude.

[hpeer]

Dockhead,

Thanks for the radar screen shot. That helped me understand a few things. Clearly not MY radar. LOL. It would be interesting to see what the Fits radar looked like.

Beyond that i agree with your fitness assessment. What comes across, what i hear, is that the Navy does not understand just how bad they are, what others accomplish routinely with a comparative pittance in money and man power.

Frankly what came across is that the Navy does not know what a Professional Mariner is in terms of capabilities. This is from hearing the 3 incidents: the gulf in ident where the captain was clearly a cowboy who ignored advice from his team, here where the tram could nit negotiate a commercial channel, and the third where Bridge team did not understand their control systems.

Elsewhere I read the riot problem is that Navy promotion structure requires filks ti have sea time to move up, but that those folks have no real bidding interest in at sea commands. Sea command time is something to “get done” for advancement, a necessary evil.

[Dockhead]

Originally Posted by hpeer

. . . Elsewhere I read the riot problem is that Navy promotion structure requires filks ti have sea time to move up, but that those folks have no real bidding interest in at sea commands. Sea command time is something to “get done” for advancement, a necessary evil.

I'm not sure that is necessarily a problem. A competent executive does not necessarily be able to do the stuff his people need to be able to do well. What a competent executive crucially needs to be able to do is to be damned sure that his people are capable of doing it -- and that the systems and procedures ensure it. That is where the pooch has been well and truly screwed.

Originally Posted by hpeer

. . . what i hear, is that the Navy does not understand just how bad they are . . .

That sounds right. If they only knew, they would surely have done something about

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by requiem

Also interesting is Vessel C in the Japanese report, which apparently Fitzgerald crossed ahead of by about 1600-1700 yards a half hour earlier. Perhaps there's a local tradition of using the signalling lights?

Vessel C also reported seeing Fitz's masthead lights and assuming it was a warship based on the spacing.

Noticed also the Japanese report nailed down Crystal's turn - started at 0117 and steady by 0119.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by Dockhead

This is the radar picture referred to in several posts:


Attachment 222906


You can see Crystal's radar was badly tuned. Nevertheless, Fitz shows up clearly. What radar operator would leave the screen in that condition. I think they weren't watching it.

Crystal had a poor watch. They claimed to only see Fitz's stbd running light, but vessel C reported seeing lights for a warship within the half-hour; in addition to that they made the assumption that a single green light was a "fishing vessel" (curious more hasn't been made of those watchkeepers' colreg competence?); their radar was horribly-tuned and they weren't tracking the vessels they turned towards; they made their planned course change before Wan Hai did (seen on Wan Hai's radar images in the Japanese report) - so they turned to close a slower vessel on their port beam.

Another tidbit from the Japanese report, that local mariners should have known - there's no fishing on Saturday, so not likely going to see a fishing vessel.

[hpeer]

A competent executive needs to know WHAT his people need to do, who does know, and when to listen to them.

There are examples on all three points within these accidents.