US Navy Destroyer Collision Again!!!

[Hydra]

I think that in the (distant) past, Navy officers were expected to be able to take the place of any other who would have been killed or wounded in action (or incapacitated by scurvy). For this, they just needed a general understanding of how their ship worked.

It seems that this concept hasn't been updated.

Alain

[TwoBlocked]

Originally Posted by Captsteve53

AIS track of the tanker:

USS John S. McCain Collision: AIS Animation Shows Tanker's Track During Collision – gCaptain

The only thing it really shows is the amount of traffic, worth a look

Cheers Steve

Maybe there is something to see. Notice the Guang Zhou Wan (another coastal tanker) first being on the Alnic MC's port quarter, as if to overtake in the separation zone, but then altering course to starboard a little while before the collision? I am not sure how long before in real time, but there is a report that the McCain had a steering failure 3 minutes before the collision. Perhaps the Guang was able to get clear, but the Alnic could not.

[estarzinger]

Interesting. No surprise they did not detect McCain on AiS, but is somewhat surprising that they also did not see them on radar - because there is a radar on Horsburgh lighthouse (at about 40m height) feeding the VTS (this is well within range of the collision area).

Only tanker was detected before collision with US destroyer, Singapore News & Top Stories - The Straits Times

[Snowpetrel]

Originally Posted by Hydra

I think that in the (distant) past, Navy officers were expected to be able to take the place of any other who would have been killed or wounded in action (or incapacitated by scurvy). For this, they just needed a general understanding of how their ship worked.

It seems that this concept hasn't been updated.

Alain

I think the ships are too complex these days (and in the past)for any one individual to be fully across all areas. A decent general understanding of all departments would be important but if they are an OOW you would think they would specailise in the seamanship/navigation side. If the officer is engineering that would be their specialisation? I am guessing you would also have electronics and warfare officers who specailise in these areas? Maybe not. Are the officers shuffled around and expected to be able to quickly adapt to what should probably be specailised tasks?

If you go to hospital you generally hope you'd get treated by a specailist doctor with extensive experiance in the relevant field of medicine relating to your condition, rather than a GP with a very broad general knowledge of medicine, but little specialist training.

I agree about getting rusty. After a few years without much seatime I find it takes a while to get back into the groove.

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

Interesting. No surprise they did not detect McCain on AiS, but is somewhat surprising that they also did not see them on radar - because there is a radar on Horsburgh lighthouse (at about 40m height) feeding the VTS (this is well within range of the collision area).

Only tanker was detected before collision with US destroyer, Singapore News & Top Stories - The Straits Times

When AIS first became mandatory, then globally accepted by most mariners I was concerned that the reliance on this system would be at the expense of proper radar watchkeeping.
This may be what happened with VTIS who skipped over what should have been an obvious radar target, thus failing to alert the ships of the warships proximity.

Or perhaps they are instructed to ignore military craft in their monitoring duties?

[hpeer]

A couple of thoughts that may transgress into too much speculation.

The Admiral was fired, that indicates to me the cause was something he should have had control over. A out of the blue steering failure does not match this profile. Could be wrong. Maybe he's just a scapegoat.

The AIS track (IIRC) showed three vessels pretty closely grouped including the Alnico. I find its uprising the McCain was traveling with that tight packed group, there was more room a while latter.

Apparently the traffic radar was working, saw the Alnico. Just eyeballing it I don't think these AB destroyers are very stealthy. Their return should not be hugely smaller than this tanker.

So why would the McCain be in this pack and why would the radar not see it?

One answer comes to mind, the McCain was running dark intentionally with a pack of ships, pacing the lead ship (Team Olso) and trying to hide in its radar shadow. Imagine the McCain was in Team Oslos shadow, close aboard, lost steering, Team Oslo pulled safely away. The next ship, close behind, wham! Air Force jets have been known to do this kind of shadowing, why not Navy ships? Admiral was fired for allowing this kind of gaming.

A lot of speculation there but a first glance seems to make a cohesive story. Maybe.

There should be tapes of interstitial VHF traffic. That might be interesting.

Internet is real poor here, hard to get much graphic data.

[Delancey]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

Interesting. No surprise they did not detect McCain on AiS, but is somewhat surprising that they also did not see them on radar - because there is a radar on Horsburgh lighthouse (at about 40m height) feeding the VTS (this is well within range of the collision area).

Only tanker was detected before collision with US destroyer, Singapore News & Top Stories - The Straits Times

Active cancellation comes to mind. Not giving away any state secrets here. Active sound cancellation is yesterday's news. Extrapolate...

[Boatguy30]

I encountered a number of "war ships" as they identify on VHF off the east coast this spring running w/o proper nav lights nor transmitting AIS. I reported this on the SSCA SSB net and to Chris Parker.

I wonder if this was not the case here also.

[TwoBlocked]

Originally Posted by Hydra

I think that in the (distant) past, Navy officers were expected to be able to take the place of any other who would have been killed or wounded in action (or incapacitated by scurvy). For this, they just needed a general understanding of how their ship worked.

It seems that this concept hasn't been updated.

Alain

It's more like if someone is taken out due to hostile action, everyone from below moves up. That was (is?) standard practice during REFTRA (Refresher Training). As soon as a battle scenario starts, key people are told they are dead and everyone else must fill in as best they can. I think one of the many reasons there are so many sailors on Navy ships is so if they lose a large percentage, they can still function. But in the meantime you have to have something for them to do. So you have three times as many lookouts as is really required, and everybody having some little thing to do. But then coordination is problematic and when someone drops a piece of the puzzle...

[TwoBlocked]

Originally Posted by hpeer

...

The Admiral was fired, that indicates to me the cause was something he should have had control over. A out of the blue steering failure does not match this profile. Could be wrong. Maybe he's just a scapegoat.

...

There was (is?) a message called a SITREP (Situation Report). Suppose the McCain had been having trouble with the steering gear, sent SITREPs about it, but repairs were not properly handled, or just left until later and doing so was standard procedure in the 7th Fleet.

But then this Admiral was due to retire very soon, and his planned relief was just brought in early. Great PR for showing the Navy is serious, but makes little actual change. I don't put either of these scenarios as unlikely. They really don't have my trust.

[savoir]

Originally Posted by El Pinguino

Of course he is.... google never lies

With an afternoon departure I would be heading for my bunk soon after passing Horsborough.... and would wake up in the Gulf of Thailand.... never did worry to much about where the transition was...

Back on track... that 12 knot restriction mentioned in the Miami Herald .. news to me... news to the bridge team on the Hyundai doing 19 knots as well.

Last time I was there was , I admit, over 10 years ago but plenty ships including us poking along at high .. ie + 20 knot ... speeds

I'm not too sure that the Miami herald has it right about the 12 knots.

The Singapore government has not published a circular to that effect. The Malaysian government may have published something but their internet system is really hard to sift through so I can't be sure. The COLREGS say nothing.

[El Pinguino]

Originally Posted by savoir

I'm not too sure that the Miami herald has it right about the 12 knots.

The Singapore government has not published a circular to that effect. The Malaysian government may have published something but their internet system is really hard to sift through so I can't be sure. The COLREGS say nothing.

I found this re deep draught etc

2.4.2 Rules for Vessels Navigating Through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
The rules for vessels navigating through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore which has been adopted by IMO, came into force in May 1981. These rules are published in the IMO Ships Routeing (1991). These are associated rules and recommendations which define vessels of draught 15 metres or more to be deemed as deep draught vessels, and tankers of 150,000 dwt and above to be deemed as a very large crude carriers (VLCC). The focus of these rules is more for the deep draught vessels and VLCCs. Some of the unique key provisions in these rules include the requirement for a minimum under-keel clearance of at least 3.5 metres, a designated deep water route, no overtaking in the deep water route, a speed restriction of 12 knots and a voluntary ship reporting system for deep draught vessels.'

that was here, a paper dating from 2000..

http://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewconten..._dissertations

Maybe the rule has been extended since then..

[David M]

After that article, it seems naval officers should be moving more vertically through the system. I understand the importance of cross training so that one can fill in for another but these ships are so incredibly complex now that the cross training may never be effective enough to be of any good.

[Alan Mighty]

Originally Posted by savoir

The Singapore government has not published a circular to that effect. The Malaysian government may have published something but their internet system is really hard to sift through so I can't be sure. The COLREGS say nothing.

Singapore's Maritime & Port Authority (MPA), not any agency of the Malaysian govt, sets the rules for vessels in the Singapore Strait. The MPA rules also cover the Malacca Strait, but the Malaysian govt authority (the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency) is the enforcing agency there.

The MPA rules are clear and simple (and can be found at: http://www.mpa.gov.sg/web/wcm/connec...../pc06-20.pdf ). They start by restating ColRegs, and go from there (the proper thing to do).

My quick summary:

For all vessels, proceed at a safe speed for the conditions.

For VLCCs and vessels limited by their draught, proceed at not more than 12 knots if that is safe and practical.

The MPA's wording is more clear and, apart from the loss of formatting from me copying and pasting the PDF referenced above, looks like:

SAFETY OF NAVIGATION IN THE SINGAPORE STRAIT

1 The Singapore Strait is a narrow and busy waterway where a large number of vessels transit daily. These vessels include bulk carriers, container vessels, ferries, tankers, very large crude carriers (VLCC), barges under tow and fishing vessels. In the interest of navigational safety, shipmasters of vessels navigating in the Singapore Strait are reminded to observe the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Seas (COLREGS) and the “Rules for Vessels Navigating Through The Straits of Malacca and Singapore” adopted by the IMO. A copy of the latter is attached.

2 To enhance navigational safety, the Singapore Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS) constantly monitors vessel movements in the Singapore Strait and provides traffic information and advice to shipmasters to enable them to appraise the traffic situation. The Singapore VTIS has observed that reducing vessel’s speed is an action not commonly taken and would like to remind shipmasters of the following rules concerning actions on speed of vessels:

i) International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972

Rule 6: Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and condition.

In determining a safe speed the following factors shall be among those taken into account:

(a) By all vessels:
(i) the state of visibility;
(ii) the traffic density including concentrations of fishing vessels or
any other vessels;
(iii) the manoeuvrability of the vessel with special reference to
stopping distance and turning ability in the prevailing conditions;
(iv) at night the presence of background light such as from shore
lights or from back scatter of her own lights;
(v) the state of wind, sea and current, and the proximity of
navigational hazards;
(vi) the draught in relation to the available depth of water.

(b) Additionally, by vessels with operational radar:
(i) the characteristics, efficiency and limitations of the radar
equipment;
(ii) any constraints imposed by the radar scale in use;
(iii) the effect on radar detection of the sea state, weather and
other sources of interference;
(iv) the possibility that small vessels, ice and other floating objects
may not be detected by radar at an adequate range;
(v) the number, location and movement of vessels detected by
radar;
(vi) the more exact assessment of the visibility that may be
possible when radar is used to determine the range of vessels
or other objects in the vicinity.

Rule 8 (e): If necessary to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation, a vessel shall slacken her speed or take all way off by stopping or reversing her means of propulsion.

ii) Rules for Vessels navigating through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Rule (7): VLCCs and deep draught vessels navigating in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore shall, as far as it is safe and practicable, proceed at a speed of not more than 12 knots over the ground in the following areas:

(a) At One Fathom Bank traffic separation scheme;
(b) Deep-water routes in the Phillip Channel and in Singapore Strait; and
(c) Westbound lanes between positions 01°12.51’N, 103°52.15’E and 01°11.59’N, 103°50.21’E and between position 01°11.13’N, 103°49.08’E and 01°08.65’N,103°44.30’E.

Rule 8: All vessels navigating in the routing system of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore shall maintain at all times a safe speed consistent with safe navigation, shall proceed with caution and shall be in a maximum state of manoeuvring readiness.

[El Pinguino]

Originally Posted by Alan Mighty

Singapore's Maritime & Port Authority (MPA), not any agency of the Malaysian govt, sets the rules for vessels in the Singapore Strait. The MPA rules also cover the Malacca Strait, but the Malaysian govt authority (the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency) is the enforcing agency there.

The MPA rules are clear and simple (and can be found at: http://www.mpa.gov.sg/web/wcm/connec...../pc06-20.pdf ). They start by restating ColRegs, and go from there (the proper thing to do).

My quick summary:

For all vessels, proceed at a safe speed for the conditions.

For VLCCs and vessels limited by their draught, proceed at not more than 12 knots if that is safe and practical.

The MPA's wording is more clear and, apart from the loss of formatting from me copying and pasting the PDF referenced above, looks like:

SAFETY OF NAVIGATION IN THE SINGAPORE STRAIT

1 The Singapore Strait is a narrow and busy waterway where a large number of vessels transit daily. These vessels include bulk carriers, container vessels, ferries, tankers, very large crude carriers (VLCC), barges under tow and fishing vessels. In the interest of navigational safety, shipmasters of vessels navigating in the Singapore Strait are reminded to observe the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Seas (COLREGS) and the “Rules for Vessels Navigating Through The Straits of Malacca and Singapore” adopted by the IMO. A copy of the latter is attached.

2 To enhance navigational safety, the Singapore Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS) constantly monitors vessel movements in the Singapore Strait and provides traffic information and advice to shipmasters to enable them to appraise the traffic situation. The Singapore VTIS has observed that reducing vessel’s speed is an action not commonly taken and would like to remind shipmasters of the following rules concerning actions on speed of vessels:

i) International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972

Rule 6: Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and condition.

In determining a safe speed the following factors shall be among those taken into account:

(a) By all vessels:
(i) the state of visibility;
(ii) the traffic density including concentrations of fishing vessels or
any other vessels;
(iii) the manoeuvrability of the vessel with special reference to
stopping distance and turning ability in the prevailing conditions;
(iv) at night the presence of background light such as from shore
lights or from back scatter of her own lights;
(v) the state of wind, sea and current, and the proximity of
navigational hazards;
(vi) the draught in relation to the available depth of water.

(b) Additionally, by vessels with operational radar:
(i) the characteristics, efficiency and limitations of the radar
equipment;
(ii) any constraints imposed by the radar scale in use;
(iii) the effect on radar detection of the sea state, weather and
other sources of interference;
(iv) the possibility that small vessels, ice and other floating objects
may not be detected by radar at an adequate range;
(v) the number, location and movement of vessels detected by
radar;
(vi) the more exact assessment of the visibility that may be
possible when radar is used to determine the range of vessels
or other objects in the vicinity.

Rule 8 (e): If necessary to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation, a vessel shall slacken her speed or take all way off by stopping or reversing her means of propulsion.

ii) Rules for Vessels navigating through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Rule (7): VLCCs and deep draught vessels navigating in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore shall, as far as it is safe and practicable, proceed at a speed of not more than 12 knots over the ground in the following areas:

(a) At One Fathom Bank traffic separation scheme;
(b) Deep-water routes in the Phillip Channel and in Singapore Strait; and
(c) Westbound lanes between positions 01°12.51’N, 103°52.15’E and 01°11.59’N, 103°50.21’E and between position 01°11.13’N, 103°49.08’E and 01°08.65’N,103°44.30’E.

Rule 8: All vessels navigating in the routing system of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore shall maintain at all times a safe speed consistent with safe navigation, shall proceed with caution and shall be in a maximum state of manoeuvring readiness.

So no change since 1981 and no blanket speed limit....

I guess that explains why I didn't get a speeding ticket...