US Navy destroyer collision

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by hpeer

It's not about turning AIS on and off. It's about having the AIS RECIEVE turned on. That's what I don't get. You can just turn off the transmit and still see the container ship and still not revel your position.

That is what I find absolutely inexcusable. You can have it both ways, recieve but not transmit. You do then have to look at the damn thing. Which seems to be where they failed.

I don't understand and why folks keep talking about turning AIS on and off. It's just the transmit function. The CS knew where the Fitz was, it's the Fitz not looking at AIS, or anything else apparently, that caused the problem.

You're making an assumption. There are some suggesting that Fitz was aware of the situation, but erroneously attempted to proceed ahead of the CS. That doesn't discount the possibility that they were using AIS info.

[jtsailjt]

Originally Posted by SecondBase

On Fatigue, IME the military is hard-charging and often sleep-deprived. To give an idea when a soldier is going to operate under these conditions a piece of cord is tied from the equipment belt to the rifle. The sound of the dragging rifle reminding one, eventually, to pick it up. Working with that level of fatigue is praised as part of the warrior ethos, toughness, "stress similar to combat", winnowing, etc. And yes it achieves some of those goals for sure.

My assumption is that bits of that culture transferred over to military aviation way back when. It led where you would expect it to. And then - at least the way I'll tell it for discussion - then Crew Rest became a requirement.

Navy Aviation appears to have Crew Rest procedures well understood.


- - - - -
From the OPNAVINST 3710.7T Chapter 8:

8.3.2.1.2 Flight Crew

Ground time between flight operations should be sufficient to allow flight crew to eat and obtain at least 8 hours of uninterrupted rest. Flight crew should not be scheduled for continuous alert and/or flight duty (required awake) in excess of 18 hours. If it becomes necessary to exceed the 18-hour rule, 15 hours of continuous off-duty time shall be provided.
8.3.2.2.a Flight Time

Daily flight time should not normally exceed three flights or 6-1/2 total hours flight time for flight personnel of single-piloted aircraft. Individual flight time for flight personnel of other aircraft should not normally exceed 12 hours. The limitations assume an average requirement of 4 hours ground time for briefing and debriefing.

- - - - -

This incident while awful could easily have been worse. So here's my question.

Do Navy watchstanders maintain a highly disciplined Crew Rest program?

At the time of the incident what % of the on duty Bridge team would have been fit to flight duty standards?

Though none of us have seen the final accident report and may never know all these details about sleep and rest, I wouldn't be a bit surprised if you and others are right that fatigue played a big role in this fiasco. But in addition to fatigue, there had to be a real lack of discipline for NONE of the crewmembers on duty to have noticed the close proximity of the container ship and spoken up about it. Usually, even if all are extremely fatigued, there's that one guy/gal who has the self discipline to force themselves to stay alert and continue doing their job at a high level until they literally drop from exhaustion. That's not something anyone should depend on, certainly not the USNavy, but I'm really surprised that apparently EVERYBODY on duty was "asleep at the switch."

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by jtsailjt

Though none of us have seen the final accident report and may never know all these details about sleep and rest, I wouldn't be a bit surprised if you and others are right that fatigue played a big role in this fiasco. But in addition to fatigue, there had to be a real lack of discipline for NONE of the crewmembers on duty to have noticed the close proximity of the container ship and spoken up about it. Usually, even if all are extremely fatigued, there's that one guy/gal who has the self discipline to force themselves to stay alert and continue doing their job at a high level until they literally drop from exhaustion. That's not something anyone should depend on, certainly not the USNavy, but I'm really surprised that apparently EVERYBODY on duty was "asleep at the switch."

Lots and LOTS of excuses from fatigue to security issues as to why the rest of the world that shares navigational responsibility within those water's, is still being kept in the dark.

An animation to recreate what the Fitz physically did or did not do leading up to the colission would be informative to ALL mariners and at least provide some understanding, lessons and closure from this tragedy.

Fatigue??.... I thought the Fitz had just left port the day before??.
was it weekend or bar fatigue?

IMHO It is the arrogance of naval management to be secretive about a peacetime failure that sends the wrong message to young sailors.....'No matter what you do, you will be protected from public scrutiny'
.
sorry to me...that is just wrong!

[Cavalier MK2]

I'm curious about the curren international rules governing warships.
For example is a false AIS ID allowed like the old tradition of flying someone else's flag till the cannons rolled out etc.....
For sure the old fashioned tradition of an actual look out would have helped.

[hpeer]

My point in hammering AIS is that
1. Stealth is no excuse, they could have been watching it
2. AIS makes this kind of collision avoidance stone stupid simple
3. The idea that they were intentionally ignoring it is silly, even sillier if they were actually doing it
4. That they have even better systems makes it all the more a humbling experience

Like leave it alone for now. The Navy has said they erred, good for them, more than I expected.

Hopefully there will be a more fullsome report.

One can only wonder why so many young sailors were led to make this tragic mistake.

[jtsailjt]

Originally Posted by hpeer

My point in hammering AIS is that
1. Stealth is no excuse, they could have been watching it
2. AIS makes this kind of collision avoidance stone stupid simple
3. The idea that they were intentionally ignoring it is silly, even sillier if they were actually doing it
4. That they have even better systems makes it all the more a humbling experience

Like leave it alone for now. The Navy has said they erred, good for them, more than I expected.

Hopefully there will be a more fullsome report.

One can only wonder why so many young sailors were led to make this tragic mistake.

You're right about all but #2 and even that is partially right. AIS DOES make avoidance very simple but so do the many other more sophisticated systems the Fitz was equipped with. The problem wasn't with the lack of AIS of any other piece of equipment, the problem was that nobody was looking at it or if they were looking at it, didn't use the information to avoid the collision. AIS aboard would have made no difference unless someone was looking at it and since they obviously weren't looking out the window or at their radar or at the IFF/SIF or any other detection systems they have aboard, what leads you to think they'd have been looking at their AIS? That's why I don't think AIS is a relevant issue regarding this collision.

[Captsteve53]

Since this seems to be such a talked about situation here's an article why the it is the fault of the US Navy by G captain for those have not seen it, for my observation when you have 16 or so crew on the bridge of a navy vessel monitoring every piece of equipment versus may 3 on the commercial vessel AIS should not even come into the conversation

Follow this link :The USS Fitzgerald Is At Fault. This Is Why. – gCaptain

[hpeer]

AIS, for me, is only in the conversation because it is something we are familiar with, is affordable, and helps clarify the degree of unseamanship attitude in the destroyer, bridge and CIC included.

I can tell my landlubber friends that even lowly I have electronics to avoid that failure. It makes understanding the magnitude of failure more accessible.

[SecondBase]

Originally Posted by UNCIVILIZED

As a preface to the below. I spent 4yrs as a Midshipman at Annapolis, & was commissioned as an Ensign. I had LOTS of sea time while at Annapolis; during summer training stints on ships & submarines, smaller 100'+ craft, & loads of time on the water as part of the Varsity Offshore Sailing Team. And after commissioning I went through further ship handling training, & then was assigned to a Cruiser, roughly the size of the one in this incident. So driving (conning) ships is mostly 2nd nature to me, & I also know what it's like being on the bridge of such a ship when maneuvering in close quarters:


There are great watch standers & bridge officers on USN Ships, & rather inept ones. Or rather, ones qualified on paper, but lacking in depth of experience. And while there are always "qualified" people on the bridge, how much in practice a bridge team, especially the deck officers, are, varies by a good bit.

For example, as a 20yr old Midshipman (1yr away from receiving my commission) the CO would literally send men to track me down & report to the bridge to be the deck officer (in charge) during any tricky maneuvers.

Uncivilized, a few questions if you don't mind

Does the Navy offer any badge, insignia etc for qualified Ship Drivers?

It sounds like a lot of you picking up your skill set was based on your deliberate focus in that area. Would you say that is the case?

Last question- as you were composing that mental picture "situational awareness" while conning how much of that was systems direct to you (raw data) and how much of that was verbal communication related from others. Not sure if you can put that into a percentage or if it changes based on size of vessel?

These general questions and you have some other insights would you please share them?

[hpeer]

I think that last question about verbal vs direct data is very on point.

[jtsailjt]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

Lots and LOTS of excuses from fatigue to security issues as to why the rest of the world that shares navigational responsibility within those water's, is still being kept in the dark.

An animation to recreate what the Fitz physically did or did not do leading up to the colission would be informative to ALL mariners and at least provide some understanding, lessons and closure from this tragedy.

Fatigue??.... I thought the Fitz had just left port the day before??.
was it weekend or bar fatigue?

IMHO It is the arrogance of naval management to be secretive about a peacetime failure that sends the wrong message to young sailors.....'No matter what you do, you will be protected from public scrutiny'
.
sorry to me...that is just wrong!

Maybe, rather than fatigue, it was just being lulled into a false sense of security, thinking that somebody else was doing THEIR job so you could relax and not do yours quite as carefully as you might? Who really knows and does it really matter? The point is that many people on board were not doing their jobs and that needs to change and that's something the Navy obviously needs to address, but exactly how they go about doing that isn't really yours or my business.

Certainly a full report with all the details about WHY nobody was paying attention would be informative but I disagree about "closure" (whatever that means) or about the message it sends young sailors. Obviously there was a HUGE screw up aboard the Fitz and the families of those who died already know that. You and I knowing exact details of who was supposed to be doing what but didn't may satisfy yours and my curiosity but is beyond what anyone who doesn't serve aboard one of these ships can really understand because we aren't familiar with exactly what all the officers and watch standers job descriptions are and exactly what they SHOULD have been doing. Because I was "in the community" I've known inside info about many military aircraft accidents and there was never a public hue and cry like this about releasing all those details and if most of you had been told exactly what the pilot did wrong, you wouldn't have been able to understand it anyway. It's enough to know that the pilot screwed up and that it was studied and corrective action is taken to avoid a repeat accident in the future. But sometimes the "corrective action" is to simply remove those who, despite rules and guidance directing them to do something, they chose not to do it. Many on this site seem to think there's something arrogant about that but I don't see it that way at all. It's just always been that way and nobody is covering up or denying responsibility for this foulup. It's enough for us all to know that the USNavy was responsible and will address whatever deficiencies caused this and that's really all you or I are entitled to know or need to know. We have no need to know who the individuals involved were or to become intimately familiar with the wording and interpretation of their internal rules that were violated which led to this. If you really want to know all those details, then run for congress and get yourself onto a House oversight committee and then you'll be in a "need to know" position.

As for sending the wrong message regarding protecting military personnel from public scrutiny, that's how it is and isn't going to change. Unless the military personnel committed a crime so they are court martialed, the individuals involved will remain anonymous and that's how it should be IMHO. It might be fun to know the name of the officers and crew who should have been much more vigilant, but what good would it really do you? Rest assured that they will be punished and/or retrained appropriately, whether you know the details of that or not. Once again, relating this to flying, (US as well as other countries) military pilots don't even need to have a FAA license so they have no license that can be in jeopardy of a violation like a civilian or commercial pilot has. If a military pilot does something he shouldn't do, whether it leads to an accident or not, the military is responsible for punishing/retraining him and the FAA has nothing to do with it and his name will not be released to the press so there will be no "public scrutiny" of the individuals involved. Of course, word will leak out but it won't be official info and you won't see them giving press conferences and interviews, etc. It'll all be internal but I can guarantee there will be VERY serious repercussions for those found to be responsible.

[jtsailjt]

Originally Posted by hpeer

AIS, for me, is only in the conversation because it is something we are familiar with, is affordable, and helps clarify the degree of unseamanship attitude in the destroyer, bridge and CIC included.

I can tell my landlubber friends that even lowly I have electronics to avoid that failure. It makes understanding the magnitude of failure more accessible.

You can also tell your friends that the Navy ship had many times the electronics that you do to avoid that failure as well. Once again, the problem wasn't lack of AIS or any other equipment, the problem was that nobody was USING the wealth of available equipment. You having AIS aboard your boat won't keep you out of accidents either, IF you don't bother to look at it.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by Captsteve53

when you have 16 or so crew on the bridge of a navy vessel monitoring every piece of equipment versus may 3 on the commercial vessel

Not entirely familiar with USN destroyer manning protocols, but imaging the actual Bridge crew night peacetime steaming is actually between 3 and 8 personnel. And they all don't monitor every piece of equipment; you'll have 1 or 2 just monitoring the radios, 1 or 2 on helm and throttles, 1 acting as Boatswain's Mate - none of them are looking out the windows or monitoring navigation equipment. 1 or 2 OODs and up to 2 Lookouts might be there - and they should be keeping watch; but that means it could as little as 1 person handling the lookout/navigation responsibilities on the Bridge. This may be augmented by a radar watch in the CIC - but that's not a given.

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by jtsailjt

..... The point is that many people on board were not doing their jobs and that needs to change and that's something the Navy obviously needs to address, but exactly how they go about doing that isn't really yours or my business.

This is where I differ with that mindset....I guess I'm not a very good soldier when it comes to blindly accepting that "superiors" do not need to explain to me why there was such a major screw up.

Or why the crew need to be treated with Kidd gloves in what should be a public enquiry.

In the extreme the message is... While wearing our uniform, you can be guilty of anything and we will protect you from being outed.

That is not our democratic way of values and yes I know.......
...the military is not a democracy

[Captsteve53]

From a retired Navy guy re manning levels just for info, and yes the point is that commercial vessels may have three on the bridge at night (if your lucky) but a warship close to land or approaches:

QUOTE::The bridge team then consisted of:
1)The Officer of the Deck who was in charge during his watch.
2)Sometimes a Jr. Officer of the Deck to assist him.
3)A Quartermaster - a petty officer to help with navigation and kept the log.
4)A Boatswain mate of the watch in charge of the other enlisted watch standers. He also ensured that the people under him rotated their positions every 15 minutes to keep them alert.
5)The Helmsman - actually steers the ship.
6)The Lee Helmsman - controls the ships speed
7)The port lookout - on the port wing of the Bridge
8)The Starboard Lookout - on the Starboard wing of the Bridge.
9)The After Lookout - who was stationed on the 02 deck in the aft part of the ship.
10)There was also a Signalman in the Signal Shack just slightly aft of the Bridge