Report on yacht collision in Ireland in 2019 (report on findings)

[El Pinguino]

Originally Posted by Lodesman

Absolutely!

VTS? Plotter? Bold assumption on my part....

[El Pinguino]

Originally Posted by requiem

IIRC the track for the ship was sourced from AIS, possibly from MarineTraffic. The track from the yacht was I think from their laptop, with the inconveniently-placed mouse cursor. Having the actual exported GPX file would have allowed for direct comparison against the AIS data, but apparently it wasn't requested or provided.

The inconveniently placed mouse cursor ... when I look at it yet again ...seems to conveniently obscure a turn to port.
If you project the 000º track to where it would join the track ( 200ºish ?) as she is bounced down the side of the ship you would see it above the cursor....

[Breaking Waves]

on the 'keeping an open mind' aspect. . . . . you want to enter the investigation with an open mind, but when you get to the point of writing a report you do aspire to have reached conclusions.

When you entered this investigation you would have wanted to understand the geometry.

The ship presents one hypothesis - red to green crossing with collision cpa.
The yacht presents an alternative hypothesis - green to green with no crossing/no collision.

You gather track data - AIS from the ship and plotter from the yacht. Combining those two tracks you end up with a picture that is exactly consistent with the ship's hypothesis.

And the ship had a radar solution (target speed course and cpa) consistent with their hypothesis.

There is no data to support the yacht hypothesis. No radar, no compass bearings, and it is inconsistent with the tracks. And a couple of pieces of their claimed supporting observations are inconsistent or in error (just for example: they only ever saw green which is why they claim they just held course and never saw a red light despite hitting the ship on its port side and the error of which side a green light would be on -no 'smoking guns' but not helpful to their case).

You might be drawing a conclusion at that point about which hypothesis was rather more likely to be the correct one.

Originally Posted by El Pinguino

The inconveniently placed mouse cursor ...seems to conveniently obscure a turn to port.

yea, I noted that.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by Breaking Waves

.....You are still ducking the question - Very specifically what extra information would you have asked for, which would have made a significant difference in our understanding of the situation, and which the ship watchstanders could have answered? There is ALWAYS 'missing information', some of which is not feasible to actually get and much is 'nice to have' but does not change our fundemental understanding of a situation.

Well to start with, they could have asked the range and bearing of the Moody, when it was first detected by radar. They could have clarified if it was a tracked contact, or hooked by the WK on finding it.

What we do know is that the ship believed they had a zero cpa with the yacht, and they believed they were the give way vessel, and they saw a red light (not green to green) with radar showing confirming geometry, and they believed their turn was large enough to pass astern of the yacht (ofc not anticipating it might turn to port) - are you really suggeting in that situation (without 20/20 hindsight) they should not have turned to starboard?

If the contact was in or close to the turning circle, then absolutely the turn should have been the other way.

We dont know if the yacht turned or not. The report writers suggested 'there is evidence to support the assertion ...they turned to port' (and outlined that). If they did turn, it could have been done with the autopilot still on. You can change course with an autopilot you know (the 2nd guy does not seem to acknowledge this possibility).

Don't be condescending. It really depends on the steering gear set-up. With my hydraulic system, with "Otto" engaged, the wheel spins freely. The investigators could have deconflicted that issue - they chose not to. There is the reality of the geometry at collision. If yacht was heading 000º and ship turned 60º from 161º to 221º, that would have made about 40º angle of incidence - the damage to the Moody would then have been port-side. Since that is not the case, the assumption is the angle of incidence had to be less acute. Two possibilities - yacht turned to port, or yacht's heading was less than 000º.

In any case, what we know is . . . they did not think it was a collision situation (until potentially the last moment) and they steered their bow directly into the side of the ship. They claim under autopilot. By the ship time-line the 5 toots were at least 2 minutes befoire the collision (sometime between 2.18 and 2.20) - my personal guess is those toots were the impluse to wake up the deck crew.

Bollocks. The 5 toots occurred after the ship started turning and apparently saw the sailboat turn - what they saw was the red turn to green, which I said before would have occurred with the bearing of the yacht moving right. Not addressed by the investigators nor ruled out.


It is simply suggestive of the lack of attention on the yacht they did not have a radio watch capable of detecting such a call

All of your points are pure speculation. The writing of the VE's captain suggests less-than-fluent English. Curious the report doesn't have a first-hand account from the watchkeeper's perspective. This is also something they could have asked for.

I also guessed the picture ping mentioned came from a screen shot of the yacht plotter . . . . but it is supportive of the report's presumed geometry and crossing diagram.........

IIRC one of the Moody pilots complained the arrow hides the point of collision, presumably because in his mind that would have shown the Moody hadn't turned. It would have been nice if the report explained from where that image was obtained. The orientation of the picture is somewhat curious, as the apparently N-S line is slanted to the right. I assume the line to the left of the track is a meridian, but without knowing the mapping system, not sure what is actually shown. To me that makes it appear the Moody's path over ground was about 358/9º. We know the wind and sea were from the port quarter, so presumably the boat's heading was left of that - by how much we can only guess. I'm sure the investigators could have polled the Moody owner's association to get a feel for the amount of leeway that would be expected in those conditions. Curious there's no discussion at all about surface current, as that would also play into the heading/CMG assessment.

[Breaking Waves]

Originally Posted by Lodesman

Well to start with, they could have asked the range and bearing of the Moody, when it was first detected by radar. They could have clarified if it was a tracked contact, or hooked by the WK on finding it.

And what conclusion would that extra information have changed? The Ship reports a CPA and speed for the target, so there was some sort of target solution. Based on closing speeds and light ranges the investigators concluded the range was 'roughtly 1.5nm'. The target was on their starboard bow in a crossing, not head on, configuration. This was in the draft and the ship accepted it as correct.

This information all seems like 'nice to have' information.

If the contact was in or close to the turning circle, then absolutely the turn should have been the other way.


If they still had a zero cpa within their turning circle they had a decent probability of being f&*ked unless the yacht did its part and helped avoid, and the yacht either did nothing or the wrong thing.

In any case, the vessel started its turn 4 minutes before the collision. We can estimate that was at about 1 mile range to the yacht, likely outside its turning circle. The ship bridge believed it was in time and sufficient to pass astern of the yacht. And the investigators indicated they agreed this was the correct action by the ship (except later than optimal action because of the radio call).

Two possibilities - yacht turned to port, or yacht's heading was less than 000º.

Yes, again two hypothesis - ship hypothesis they saw the yacht make a turn to port. Yacht hypothesis they did not. The yacht had an opportunity to conclusively prove their case here with a plotter picture, and instead apparently chose not to. The investigators concluded there was evidence to suggest the yacht turned to port, that it could not be conclusively proven, but that in any case they did not take the correct evasive action reguired of them.

Bollocks.

Yes, if you look up thread you will see I agreed/admitted the timeline suggests this was wrong. But that same time line also suggests the yacht should have heard the 5 toots, before the collision.

The writing of the VE's captain suggests less-than-fluent English.

They did in fact have successful radio communication with the ship after the collision. There is no mention of a language problem.

As I have said . . . you don't like the report, so be it. Very little is perfect in this world. I continue to believe they efficiently outlined the alternative hypothesis's and the most probable circumstances.

..........

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by Breaking Waves

.......
And what conclusion would that extra information have changed? The Ship reports a CPA and speed for the target, so there was some sort of target solution. Based on closing speeds and light ranges the investigators concluded the range was 'roughtly 1.5nm'. The target was on their starboard bow in a crossing, not head on, configuration. This was in the draft and the ship accepted it as correct.

Well it might have changed the perspective on what happened, and whether a turn to stbd was appropriate. It may have called into question whether MM was going 7.9kts - which others have already suggested as suspect. It's curious that that speed wasn't connected with a course assessment.

If they still had a zero cpa within their turning circle they had a decent probability of being f&*ked unless the yacht did its part and helped avoid, and the yacht either did nothing or the wrong thing.

Honestly they have no way of telling the reliability of the "0 cpa" assessment - on the face of it, it looks like the initial ARPA solution, which could be quite rough. The fact that you have both Moody drivers and the larger sailing community saying that speed is suspect, should probably confirm a rough ARPA calc. Turning away from the danger would have eliminated collision with a slower vessel, or reduced the relative impact speed with a faster one.

In any case, the vessel started its turn 4 minutes before the collision. We can estimate that was at about 1 mile range to the yacht, likely outside its turning circle. The ship bridge believed it was in time and sufficient to pass astern of the yacht. And the investigators indicated they agreed this was the correct action by the ship (except later than optimal action because of the radio call).

You've got to be kidding. For that matter the investigators are barmy too - they've constructed a timeline that doesn't even match the VE master's account. At 0115 the WK saw the light and went to the radar, tuned it, hooked the contact, 30 sec later got initial info. He then went to the radio and tried to call (or maybe AIS, then radio). He then switched the helm to manual and made a turn - time not in the master's account, but the investigators decided was 0118. looking at the AIS plot at 0118 VE was still very much steering 161º. So let's just say the helm went over some time after 0118. For some reason the investigators allege VE reduced speed at 0120 and the collision occurred at 0122; when you read the master's account the helm was still hard over when the collision occurred at about 0121, and after that he "directly reduced speed." No turning data was provided, which again could have been asked for, to make a better determinate of when the course alteration actually took place (and how far from MM they were).

Yes, again two hypothesis - ship hypothesis they saw the yacht make a turn to port.

No they saw the green sidelight open up. As I explained that could have happened as a matter of relative bearing increase.

Yes, if you look up thread you will see I agreed/admitted the timeline suggests this was wrong. But that same time line also suggests the yacht should have heard the 5 toots, before the collision.

From the master's own report the 5 short came in the turn -just as the collision would have been occurring.

As I have said . . . you don't like the report, so be it. Very little is perfect in this world. I continue to believe they efficiently outlined the alternative hypothesis's and the most probable circumstances....

They haven't outlined any alternatives. They've gone with an easy answer, which may or may not be correct - but they've ignored any contrary evidence.

[Breaking Waves]

Originally Posted by Lodesman

They haven't outlined any alternatives. They've gone with an easy answer, which may or may not be correct - but they've ignored any contrary evidence.

no.

they clearly stated the two alternative hypotheses for the geometry

they clearly stated the two alternative hypotheses for the yacht's potential turn

they concluded in the first case the ships hypothesis was correct

they concluded in the second case the ship's hypothesis was likely but not absolutely provable

Originally Posted by Lodesman

For that matter the investigators are barmy

hmmm . . yea sure they must be idiots lol [/s]

Thanks for the discussion. I disagree with you. But your perspective is interesting.

[Miguelso]

I would not like to fly with a pilot who doesn't know which light correspond to each side of his plane/boat. But they are definitely some lucky guys...

[Breaking Waves]

Originally Posted by Miguelso

I would not like to fly with a pilot who doesn't know which light correspond to each side of his plane/boat. But they are definitely some lucky guys...

I flew a little. In conversation with my instructors (all military, some navy and others airforce), the plane had port and starboard parts (like there was a port engine and a starboard engine). BUT when we discussed maneuvers it was left and right (like bank left). We were taught 'red port wine' though for lights. So, I am equally surprised a commercial pilot would confuse that even when potentially quite fateigued.

and yea, lucky, if instead of hitting the side of the ship they had been a little faster (or the ship a little slower) and they had gotten right under the bows of the ship . . . things would have probably been rather worse.

[B23iL23]

Very very lucky boys. This is the aftermath of another collision in 2001 just 15 miles north of this. 4 on the yacht didn't make it.

Most yachts never win in a situation like this.

Originally Posted by Miguelso

I would not like to fly with a pilot who doesn't know which light correspond to each side of his plane/boat. But they are definitely some lucky guys...

[El Pinguino]

Like a moth to the flame.......

Report by yacht crew gives 'approximate' position of the collision to three decimal places of a minute of arc..... about 1.7 metres in latitude , somewhat less in longitude.
That to me shows a certain lack of awareness and understanding of all sorts of things.....

I assume it was the 'approximate' position of the pointy end of the yacht at time of impact....

[wingssail]

Originally Posted by Breaking Waves

no.

they clearly stated the two alternative hypotheses for the geometry

they clearly stated the two alternative hypotheses for the yacht's potential turn

they concluded in the first case the ships hypothesis was correct

they concluded in the second case the ship's hypothesis was likely but not absolutely provable



hmmm . . yea sure they must be idiots lol [/s]

Thanks for the discussion. I disagree with you. But your perspective is interesting.

Well now that Lodesmith and Breaking waves have run out of steam on their discussion I'd like to make a point, one which I've made before but which was never accepted as reasonable or valid. I'll try again.

Early avoiding action is better than late avoiding action. In this case it was not possible to take earlier action because both vessels reacted as soon as they were aware that there was a collision possibility, but it supports my contention that early avoidance is better than late.

I've been told that within 5 minutes, in this case 4 minutes, there is still time for a powered vessel, a ship, to make a turn and avoid a collision.

Maybe it is true in some cases, and in this case probably it was.

But it leaves no time to counter an unanticipated maneuver by either vessel.

The ship turned. But then the sailing vessel turned as well, and by most accounts, the wrong way, and at that point nothing could be done. It is most fortunate that they didn't actually get their bow across the bow of the ship, in which case we would be reading about deaths.

We should do everything possible to stay out of these close situations including turning away from the ship even if you are "stand-on" sailing vessel. Waiting until the last 4 minutes puts both vessels in the unenviable spot of having no arrows left in the their quivers.

[JPA Cate]

We should do everything possible to stay out of these close situations including turning away from the ship even if you are "stand-on" sailing vessel. Waiting until the last 4 minutes puts both vessels in the unenviable spot of having no arrows left in the their quivers.

I think this reminder from Fred really goes to the whole issue of watch standing, and how to handle one's self when feeling really tired. What I have always done is get up and move around. I do not sleep at all on my watches. (Obviously not an option for singlehanders.) It has to do with taking seriously one's duty to ship and crew, and maybe also personal pride, but if the skipper is to get any rest of his own, he has to be able to trust the crew to stay awake, or get him, or the other crew if one is available. They failed to have a plan or the plan failed in execution. Good visibility. They should have been aware of the ship, at least 1/2 hr. before, and as Fred suggests, done as necessary to avoid it. It doesn't take very long to determine one is on a collision course, and then the course change one makes should be readily obvious to the ship. Maybe 20 degrees, but enough for it to show up far enough away. Yes, one might be able to talk on the VHF, too, but usually it is not necessary for us WAFIs to avoid them.

Ann

[requiem]

Originally Posted by wingssail

Early avoiding action is better than late avoiding action. In this case it was not possible to take earlier action because both vessels reacted as soon as they were aware that there was a collision possibility, but it supports my contention that early avoidance is better than late.

The waiting until too late unfortunately seems rather common. Having the autopilot on until impact seems a particularly egregious example of this, and similar to why I don't use cruise control in dense auto traffic: it encourages a bad habit of leaving it on slightly longer than one should, in the hope that you might not need to stop it after all.

[PirateFoxy]

Originally Posted by requiem

The waiting until too late unfortunately seems rather common. Having the autopilot on until impact seems a particularly egregious example of this, and similar to why I don't use cruise control in dense auto traffic: it encourages a bad habit of leaving it on slightly longer than one should, in the hope that you might not need to stop it after all.

Adaptive cruise control has changed the way I drive as it does respond to some traffic changes. I drive with my foot in position over the brake if there is any traffic, though. Prior to ACC I just found I turned my cruise control off a lot.