USNavy Report on Fitzgerald Collision.

[Montanan]

http://https://www.maritime-executiv...ic-without-ais

A tragedy of errors:

The Navy concluded that the Fitzgerald collision was avoidable. Specifically, she appears to have violated COLREGS in several ways:

- She was not operated at a safe speed appropriate to the number of other ships in the immediate vicinity.

- She failed to maneuver early as required with risk of collision present.

- She failed to notify other ships of danger and to take proper action in extremis.

- Watchstanders performing physical look out duties did so only on Fitzgerald's left (port) side, not on the right (starboard) side where the three ships were present with risk of collision.

In addition:

- Watch team members responsible for radar operations failed to properly tune and adjust radars to maintain an accurate picture of other ships in the area.

- Supervisors responsible for maintaining the navigation track and position of other ships were unaware of existing traffic separation schemes and the expected flow of traffic, and did not utilize the Automated Identification System to gather information on nearby vessel traffic.

- Her approved navigation track did not account for, nor follow, the Vessel Traffic Separation Schemes in the area.

[Montanan]

As to the saying: If its grey, stay away.

The Fitzgerald was operating without AIS broadcasting and was also not monitoring AIS as to course and speed of the many ships around her.

Question: Is it common peacetime practice for the US Navy to not broadcast AIS so as to allow other ships monitor their position and course?

It seems like they were going stealth mode. But why wouldn't they at least receive and monitor the AIS information of other ships.

Talk about charging through traffic blindly only using navigation lights.

Sure hate to be a sailor crossing paths with such recklessness.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by Montanan

As to the saying: If its grey, stay away.

It is worth noting that the Crystal is not entirely blameless. There appears to be an inconsistency between the two images you posted - it is unclear when the Crystal altered to port at 0115 or 0119. Either way, this action conflicts with Rule 17(c):

A power-driven vessel which takes action in a crossing situation in accordance with subparagraph (a)(ii) of this Rule to avoid collision with another power-driven vessel shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, not alter course to port for a vessel on her own port side.

On top of that, the image with the TSS, seems to show the Crystal crossing a traffic lane opposite to the direction of flow, and manoeuvring about in the separation zone.

This may answer the question as to why the owners paid damages to the USN.

[kmacdonald]

If these ships were operating in confined space and channels it would have been obvious to a competent command that the traffic must stay in the designated channels. The rules of the road have little bearing here since the Navy command didn't know them and their failure of a simple rules of the road test proved that. The Navy has no purpose in modern warfare and should be ELIMINATED.

[Montanan]

Originally Posted by Lodesman

It is worth noting that the Crystal is not entirely blameless. There appears to be an inconsistency between the two images you posted - it is unclear when the Crystal altered to port at 0115 or 0119. Either way, this action conflicts with Rule 17(c):



On top of that, the image with the TSS, seems to show the Crystal crossing a traffic lane opposite to the direction of flow, and manoeuvring about in the separation zone.

This may answer the question as to why the owners paid damages to the USN.

There were many contacts which AIS tracks are not shown which movements would add to the picture and events. Meaning we are not seeing all the story.
Indeed there does appear to be some inconsistency. At 0115 it appears that the Crystal changed course to port and the Maersk Evaro shifted to Starboard as they were on a closing route. If the time stamps are accurate then Maersk appears to be operating at considerably faster speed then the Crystal and was overtaking from the starboard.


The conclusions state:
Fitzgerald approached the vessel traffic separation (VTS) scheme north of Oshima Island and came to a course of 190 at 20 knots. Her pre-approved navigation track did not account for or follow the area’s VTS patterns, she was not broadcasting an AIS signal and all her exterior lights were extinguished (except for navigation lights).

At 0108, Fitzgerald crossed the bow of a ship at approximately 650 yards, passed a second vessel at two nm and a third vessel at 2.5 nm. In contravention of standing orders, no reports of these three encounters were made to the commanding officer.

At 0110, Fitzgerald's watchstanders noted the radar signature of the container ship ACX Crystal at 11 nm, and they attempted to initiate a radar track on her, without success. At 0117, the OOD plotted a track on a vessel that he believed to be the Crystal, and determined that the contact would pass at 1500 yards on the starboard side.

At 0120, the junior officer of the deck visually sighted Crystal and noted that her course would coincide with Fitzgerald's track. The OOD remained convinced that Crystal would pass at a safe distance, even after the junior officer advised him to slow down. Two other ships – the Wan Hai and Maersk Evora – were also approaching with close CPAs, and there were over a dozen other contacts in the vicinity.


Link to article discussing the collision and provide more details. https://news.usni.org/2017/11/01/inv...sic-seamanship

Also attached is a layout of the bridge and the manning of the stations. Note there were lookouts on the port side but no one watching the starboard where the primary action was. Maybe if they had someone on the starboard side they may have given a heads up. Without AIS they were relying on radar fixes which were not well tuned and confusing to the crew.

Snipet from linked article.

"At this time, three merchant vessels were approaching Fitzgerald from its starboard side. These vessels, including motor vessel ACX Crystal, were each close enough and on a track to pose a collision risk with Fitzgerald.
Citing the International Rules of the Nautical Road, the report states Fitzgerald was in what’s considered a crossing situation with each of these ships. According to the report, “In this situation, Fitzgerald was obligated to take maneuvering action to remain clear of the other three, and if possible, avoid crossing ahead.”

Also in this situation, international navigation rules also obligate the other vessels to take evasive action if it appeared Fitzgerald was maintaining course. Yet for the 30 minutes leading up to the collision, neither Fitzgerald nor Crystal took any such action.

The officer of the deck and the junior officer of the deck discussed the relative positioning of the three other vessels and whether action was needed to avoid them. In what would ultimately prove to be a deadly mistake, the officer of the deck confused Crystal with another vessel which was further away, and initially decided no action was needed.

“Eventually, the officer of the deck realized that Fitzgerald was on a collision course with Crystal, but this recognition was too late,” the report states.

[Montanan]

US Navy makes a training simulation based on USS Fitzgerals and Crystal collision.

http://https://news.usni.org/2018/02...rald-collision

[Montanan]

Reference: https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-...ald-collision/

Snipet: Provides guidance as to monetary damages paid by the Crystal.

The probe cites failures by the Crystal’s second officer as one of the root causes of the collision.

The merchant vessel was on autopilot “until just prior to impact,” the report states, and the Crystal did not sound at least five short blasts or make any attempt to hail the warship via radio.

“Prior to the collision, CRYSTAL watchstanders came out of autopilot and initiated a turn to starboard, too late to have adequate effect,” the report states. “Audio recordings from CRYSTAL’s Bridge reveal what is most likely the sound of a signal light being used to get FTZ’ attention just minutes before the collision. FTZ watchstanders did not recall seeing this signal light.”

Note aded the Fitz did not have look outs watching the starboard side so did not see the Crystal, the Fitz had watch on the port side.

The unidentified second officer “failed to maintain a proper lookout so as to make a full appraisal of the risk of collision” with the Fitzgerald, according to the report.

The Crystal officer “failed to determine if a risk of collision with FTZ existed by using all available means,” according to the report, and “he failed to appreciate, by radar or visual observation, that FTZ was on a constant bearing with a decreasing range, which observation would have led him to deem risk of collision to exist.”


It also states the officer “failed to take action to avoid collision once it became apparent that action by FTZ alone would not avoid the collision.”

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by Montanan

Also attached is a layout of the bridge and the manning of the stations. Note there were lookouts on the port side but no one watching the starboard where the primary action was. Maybe if they had someone on the starboard side they may have given a heads up.

I think you might be confusing McCain with Fitz - Fitz had no lookouts posted, but I don't think it mattered. The OOD was aware of the vessels on her stbd side, but had them confused; a lookout could not have helped in this regard. AIS and competence with the radar may have helped.

[Montanan]

https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article...here-collision

"The sky was dark, the moon was relatively bright" on the night of June 17, when the USS Fitzgerald, a Navy destroyer, collided with a Phillipines-flagged container ship in the waters off Japan.

That's according to the U.S. Navy, which on Tuesday released its report on both the Fitzgerald and the USS McCain collisions at sea.

One glaring omission on the Fitzgerald:

“Watchstanders performing physical lookout duties did so only on Fitzgerald’s left (port) side, not on the right (starboard) side where the three ships were present with risk of collision.”

The container ship slammed into the Fitzgerald’s starboard side.

The report said Fitzgerald officers “possessed an unsatisfactory level of knowledge of the International Rules of the Nautical Road,” and “watch team members were not familiar with basic radar fundamentals, impeding effective use.”

Specifically:

-- Fitzgerald was not operated at a safe speed appropriate to the number of other ships in the immediate vicinity.

-- Fitzgerald failed to maneuver early as required with risk of collision present.

-- Fitzgerald failed to notify other ships of danger and to take proper action in extremis.

-- Watch team members responsible for radar operations failed to

properly tune and adjust radars to maintain an accurate picture of other ships in the area.

-- Watchstanders performing physical lookout duties did so only on

Fitzgerald’s left (port) side, not on the right (starboard) side where the three ships were present with risk of collision.

-- Key supervisors were unaware of existing traffic separation schemes and the expected flow of traffic.

-- Supervisors did not utilize the Automated Identification System, which provides real time updates of commercial ship positions through use of the Global Positioning System.

The report also found problems with “leadership and culture,” including ineffective communication and information-sharing between the bridge team and Combat Information Center team.

(The Combat Information Center is where equipment and personnel combine to produce the most accurate picture of the operating environment.)

Among other things, the Officer of the Deck, responsible for the safe navigation of the Fitzgerald, did not call the Commanding Officer on multiple occasions when required by Navy procedures.

In several instances, individual members of the watch teams identified incorrect information or mistakes by others, yet failed to proactively and forcefully take corrective action, or otherwise highlight or communicate their individual concerns.

The report also faulted the command leadership for allowing the crew to become fatigued.

Agreed the AIS was not being used on board the Fitz, not transmitting nor receiving. The laptop for the AIS had issues with the cabling and was prone to locking up and requiring rebooting to restore. It was stowed away next to a cabinet. So while not broadcasting the Fitz would have only been discernable by other ships via visually or by radar. The Fitz was running blackened, only showing navigation lights.

[Randy]

"The Fitz was running blackened, only showing navigation lights."
This is proper lighting while underway. Lit up like a cruise ship which only obscures navigation lights is improper. Lit up with deck lights is only correct while at anchor.

[Montanan]

Attachment 185403

Originally Posted by Randy

"The Fitz was running blackened, only showing navigation lights."
This is proper lighting while underway. Lit up like a cruise ship which only obscures navigation lights is improper. Lit up with deck lights is only correct while at anchor.

Ah, but where is the fun in that? With blue lights pulsating to a dance club beat, no one is going to miss seeing that coming.

If their radar and AIS are malfunctioning and / or lacking training then perhaps they need to go back to Mark One Eyeball and get binoculars and spyglasses.

And perhaps have lookout rotate from port to starboard frequently. Keeping watch to port when you need to give way for crossing of starboard not great practice.

[Lodesman]

Montanan - going by the diagram you posted, the lookout positions were unmanned:


And in the link you provided, the McCain's layout:


There was a discussion between the OOD and JOOD about the Crystal and the other vessels on the starboard side, so there was fundamentally nothing to be added from a lookout - they knew the vessels were there, but could not disambiguate them.

[Montanan]

Originally Posted by Lodesman

Montanan - going by the diagram you posted, the lookout positions were unmanned:


And in the link you provided, the McCain's layout:


There was a discussion between the OOD and JOOD about the Crystal and the other vessels on the starboard side, so there was fundamentally nothing to be added from a lookout - they knew the vessels were there, but could not disambiguate them.

In the Navy report there is a discrepancy between the graphic [figure 4] showing the manning and the summary of the failures.

Reference pages 7 and 21:
https://news.usni.org/2017/11/01/uss...llision-report

Go figure they can't even prepare an unconfusing report.

[kmacdonald]

Originally Posted by Lodesman

Montanan - going by the diagram you posted, the lookout positions were unmanned:


And in the link you provided, the McCain's layout:


There was a discussion between the OOD and JOOD about the Crystal and the other vessels on the starboard side, so there was fundamentally nothing to be added from a lookout - they knew the vessels were there, but could not disambiguate them.

And that's the reason for the speculation all the Navy accidents weren't accidents at all and were deliberate in order to supply work for the shipyards in exchange for kickbacks. Like I said before, I'm not sure all of the six accidents were deliberate but there is plenty of room for speculation.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by Montanan

In the Navy report there is a discrepancy between the graphic [figure 4] showing the manning and the summary of the failures.

Reference pages 7 and 21:
https://news.usni.org/2017/11/01/uss...llision-report

Go figure they can't even prepare an unconfusing report.

I understand the point on pg 21 references the ship's standard manning protocol, ie. when there is a lookout on watch, he is on the port wing, not specifically the state of manning when the accident occurred. I wonder if that is common amongst USN ships, as that was the manning in McCain during her accident. It is certainly curious.