US Navy destroyer collision

[puffcard]

USS John McCain collided this guy, the Liberian tanker Alnic MC. The name in the photo doesn't match the name bring reported.

[Wotname]

[SecondBase]

N.T.S.B.

[puffcard]

That's four in 6 months, all in the Pacific right?
USS John S. McCain
USS Fitzgerald
USS Louisiana
USS Lake Champlain

[senormechanico]

We seriously need a thread merge....

[Pelagic]

What another shame and here is hoping the missing sailors are all ok.

We need to hold judgement until the facts come out. Just hope the basic track info is not squelched as happened with the Fitz.

What is telling is that both CNN/FOX are openly hoping that the fault lies with the commercial ship, which makes me wonder about the pressures on the Navy to be open and transparent in their investigation.

[JPA Cate]

Originally Posted by senormechanico

We seriously need a thread merge....

No thread merge at this time, the other thread is moving quite rapidly right now, and is likely to be as long. Just look for the one started by Delancey.

[Pelagic]

Agree....two different incidents whose ship handling analysis would cause confusion if merged

[hpeer]

Re importance of GQ....

Would GQ matter? The report said that even some in the effected areas did not wake from the collision but by being physically pulled from their bunks into the water. Sounds unbelievable, but it's what it says.

The GQ would rouse the entire ship to a first order emergency. So yes, I do think it matters.

I didn't see an explanation of the delay in the report, but could have read over it.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by Lodesman

Still looks like a crossing situation with Fitz southbound before the crash.

Originally Posted by Lodesman

If there is a dedicated lookout, he/she will be fairly junior, might be on the other side of the bridge,

Originally Posted by Lodesman

Not entirely familiar with USN destroyer manning protocols, but imaging the actual Bridge crew night peacetime steaming is actually between 3 and 8 personnel. And they all don't monitor every piece of equipment; you'll have 1 or 2 just monitoring the radios, 1 or 2 on helm and throttles, 1 acting as Boatswain's Mate - none of them are looking out the windows or monitoring navigation equipment. 1 or 2 OODs and up to 2 Lookouts might be there - and they should be keeping watch; but that means it could as little as 1 person handling the lookout/navigation responsibilities on the Bridge. This may be augmented by a radar watch in the CIC - but that's not a given.

The report is out: http://s3.amazonaws.com/CHINFO/USS+F...on+Reports.pdf

So there were 6 pers on the bridge, and no dedicated lookouts. Not going to say "I told you so", but you did read it here first

[TwoBlocked]

Thanks for the link Lodesman!

From the perspective of a Master Mariner with a total of 24 years of military, government, and commercial experience, the broadest common factor was situational awareness. This goes triple for those that published the report. And this is true whenever situational awareness is the problem; you don’t know what you don’t know. Only someone from the outside that really does know, can see the problem clearly. Oddly, what would have most likely avoided either collision was timely and proper use of the throttles. This was not even mentioned in the report. The report also criticized the knowledge of the crew’s rules of the road, and yet they didn’t quite get it right themselves.

Here is how I read it:

Fitzgerald was an accident waiting to happen. As was customary (!), they were crossing an established and well used Traffic Separation Scheme without even knowing it was there. They did not know how to properly use their radars and blamed the equipment. Regardless, it was hit and miss as to if, when, and who could determine the CPA (closest point of approach) to the vessels they were encountering. Even with the containership flashing their searchlight into the bridge windows of the Fitz (not mentioned in the report…), it wasn’t until the OOD just happened to look that way that he just happened to notice that they were on a collision course. He started to turn right in order to pass astern, which was proper as the container ship’s red, port sidelight would have been showing. (Uh, red means danger, stop, right???) Then he changed his mind and went flank speed and hard left to try to pass ahead. (Didn’t work so well for the Andrea Doria either…)

From the containership’s perspective, they were required to maintain course and speed as the stand-on vessel, which they did until it was evident that they Fitz was not taking proper action. At that point they turned to the right, as was proper. So what do they see the Fitz do? Go flank ahead, cut across their bow and get nailed, like an idiot squirrel playing chicken on the highway! But here is the thing, if the OOD judged the situation was one that he could not avoid a collision when turning to the right – if they were just too close and closing too quickly – and hoped that he could avoid a collision by using his speed and maneuverability to go ahead of the vessel, then using those same attributes could have been used differently, more effectively, and in accordance with the Rules of the Road. He could have backed hard on the starboard screw. They are controllable pitch propellers and react very quickly. This obvious option was not even mentioned in the report, but nit-picking established procedures was, over and over again…

To me, the chilling thing is that the Fitz thought it was perfectly normal to traverse areas of dense shipping without the ability to know how close they were going to come to other vessels, let alone know how to avoid coming too close. But that is what happens when established procedures divide up the information and control of a ship’s bridge to the point that no one person has the total picture.

The McCain incident was like fumbling a football. They were going 20 knots in an area normally traveled at 12 knots for good reason. This was the Traffic Separation Scheme approaching Singapore. Those vessels going much more than 12 knots normally take their chances in the separation zone, rather than in the traffic lane, as the McCain did. So, the McCain passes the tanker, leaving it on her port side. The Captain notices that the helmsman is having difficulty managing the rudder and the throttles at the same time and orders the control of the throttles shifted to the lee (assistant) helmsman. However this is done, a mistake was made and control of both the rudder and the throttles were shifted to the lee helmsman. Moreover, the lee helmsman thought the throttles were ganged, when they were actually on separate control. (How many fumbles so far, two?) The helmsman then properly announces that he has lost steering control. The rudders are amidships, while he had been carrying a couple degrees of right rudder to maintain course. The Conning Officer then declares a steering casualty, announces the emergency throughout the ship and transfers control to after steering – BEFORE IT IS EVEN MANNED!!!

While waiting for after steering to be manned (which was a good call) they could have been trying to regain control on the bridge if they had not transferred control. There were a handful of way to control the rudders from the bridge – probably too many ways… A few minutes later some crewmembers arrive at after steering, take control of the rudders with local control already set to hard left rudder, which the rudder then responds to, swinging the ship even more to port before they are brought amidships. (Another fumble.)

Meanwhile, up on the bridge, the Captain decides to slow down and orders a speed change, but apparently nobody checks to see if the propulsion actually is responding properly. (Now just where is that darn football?) The lee helmsman eases back on the port throttle, thinking it will control both screws, but actually only slows the port screw, increasing the rate of swing to port due to the ship needing to carry some starboard rudder and the unbalanced forces from the screws, not to mention the rudders actually going hard port for a time at some point. The Captain then orders the speed reduced more. Again, only the port throttle is pulled back, nobody notices at first. Even though the speed is reduced some, the twisting force is also greater, increasing the rate of turn to port even more. (More fumbles, and was after steering ever able to regain control of the ship’s heading? Just when in relation to other events were the red-over-red, not under command lights turned on? The instant replay is inconclusive. The play stands as called on the field…)

But what about the tanker? You know, the one they shot ahead of and left on their port side, the one that they have drifted in front of, the one that is now going faster than they are? And what did the tanker see? A ship showing only a red, port sidelight pass them unconventionally on the starboard side, the red light being shielded from view as only the white sternlight becomes visible. No other deck light visible, as commercial ship have on for the safety of the ship and crew. So this lone white light of a faster vessel eventually crosses ahead of them. OK, perhaps he is headed for the separation zone where he belongs. Hmmm, is there a couple of dim red lights above and a little to the left of the white starlight? Didn’t hear anything on the radio about a vessel having difficulties. Probably just something in the distance. Wait! Are we actually getting closer to this guy?!?!? Left full rudder!

But again, since the intent was to use the throttles to control the shop’s speed, they could have easily been used to control the ship’s heading, too. This is never mentioned in the report. In both cases, the throttles being available and actually being used properly would have probably avoided both collisions. It is chilling that those writing the report never mention this, but instead see the problem that procedures were not followed, rather than so many procedures that could not be followed resulted in ignoring any inconvenient procedures. A classic example of blaming the victim – the crews of the destroyers.

[Pelagic]

Thanks Twoblocked for an excellent summation of the litany of failures in proper bridge management and leadership.
Experienced Masters are able to slow down and analyse ship's behavior in these situations and take the appropriate action, but where were the Masters in these busy waters?

[hpeer]

Two blocked
Where you mention that the authors of the report don’t seem to understand their own report? YES. That is what I see also.

And that is fairly scary. It sounds almost as though there is no one up chain that has a fundamental understanding of seamanship OR how to man/controll a bridge.

Mostly I’m a solo sailor but I’ve spent time as a cockpit crew on C-130 aircraft.

[TwoBlocked]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

Thanks Twoblocked for an excellent summation of the litany of failures in proper bridge management and leadership.
Experienced Masters are able to slow down and analyse ship's behavior in these situations and take the appropriate action, but where were the Masters in these busy waters?

Exactly! Where were the Masters, or in this case the Line Officers? It seems that they are just not on the bridge of these ships, and so I do not blame them. The blame goes to whatever is putting, well, landlubbers in charge of naval vessels. I assume it is politics (social power). If you read between the lines of the report it kinda peeks out here and there. Like the Navy will just not overextend itself anymore (yeah, right...). Like there is nothing wrong with the Navy's procedures, just that they weren't followed.

Did you notice this line: " In several instances, individual members of the watch teams identified incorrect information or mistakes by others, yet failed to proactively and forcefully take corrective action, or otherwise highlight or communicate their individual concerns"

Yep, been there, done that... Anyhoo, when you are treated like an idiot you act like an idiot, even if it is the head guy that is the real idiot. It is the natural tendency of us all to act passive-aggressively in a situation where you are damned if you do and damned if you don't. And here, right in the report, it rears it's ugly head: "You other guys that knew better should have done something more." You don't think they wanted to? Shees... This counter-productive, tyrannical attitude of "The floggings continuing until moral improves" obviously goes to the very top. It's a cultural problem, really.

[TwoBlocked]

Wait a second. Consider this portion of the Fitz timeline, especially the part in bold:

”0110 Watchstanders unsuccessfully attempted to initiate a radar track on the CRYSTAL. 0115 CRYSTAL was closing FITZGERALD’s intended track at a high rate of speed.

0117 The FITZGERALD Officer of the Deck plotted a radar track on a vessel thought to be CRYSTAL and calculated that CRYSTAL would pass 1500 yards from FITZGERALD on the right (starboard) side. It is unknown if the OOD was tracking the CRYSTAL or another commercial vessel.

0120 The watch stander responsible for immediate support to the Officer of the Deck, the Junior Officer of the Deck, reported sighting CRYSTAL visually and noted that CRYSTAL’s course would cross FITZGERALD’s track. The Officer of the Deck continued to think that CRYSTAL would pass at 1500 yards from FITZGERALD.

0122 The Junior Officer of the Deck sighted CRYSTAL again and made the recommendation to slow. The Officer of the Deck responded that slowing would complicate the contact picture.

0125 CRYSTAL was approaching FITZGERALD from the right (starboard) side at 3 nautical miles. FITZGERALD watchstanders at this time held two other commercial vessels in addition to CRYSTAL. One was calculated to have closest approach point at 2000 yards and the other was calculated to risk collision. No contact reports were made to the Commanding Officer and no additional course and speed determinations were made on these vessels.

0125 The Officer of the Deck noticed CRYSTAL rapidly getting closer and considered a turn to 240T.

0127 The Officer of the Deck ordered course to the right to course 240T, but rescinded the order within a minute. Instead, the Officer of the Deck ordered an increase to full speed and a rapid turn to the left (port). These orders were not carried out.

0129 The Bosun Mate of the Watch, a more senior supervisor on the bridge, took over the helm and executed the orders.

As of 0130 Neither FITZGERALD nor CRYSTAL made an attempt to establish radio communications or sound the danger signal.

As of 0130 FITZGERALD had not sounded the collision alarm.

0130:34 CRYSTAL’s bow struck FITZGERALD at approximately frame 160 on the right (starboard) side above the waterline and CRYSTAL’s bulbous bow struck at approximately frame 138 below the waterline.”

And yet also in the report:

"In several instances, individual members of the watch teams identified incorrect information or mistakes by others, yet failed to proactively and forcefully take corrective action, or otherwise highlight or communicate their individual concerns."

I suspect that the order was disregarded in order to try to avoid a collision. Proactive enough? I guess not... I bet you could have cut the tension in the air with a knife. An order was given and ignored (or argued against?) for 2 minutes probably by "individual members of the watch teams [that] identified incorrect information or mistakes by others" until the Bosun took the controls. Then a minute later is the collision, and that was with the container ship turning away.

I bet the audio will be a classic.