Well Done Norway! US Navy take notes!

[jmh2002]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

...these are not constrained waters. Plenty of space to safely maneuver. Problem was simply inadequate /inexperienced lookouts / sloppy communication with VTS control, tanker pilot and warship.

And by "Lookout" I mean detection by all available methods

I totally agree

As I mentioned earlier, with all these collisions it is often made out that there was an enormously complex and impossible to understand or predict set of events that led to the accident.

When actually often it was just simple human failure to act appropriately given the circumstances.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by Terje Vigen

First of all, the tanker SOLA TS did not sail "close to shore". The distance was more than half a nautical mile (about 1 km).

The point of collision is almost exactly half a NM from a marked obstruction. The period up to then Sola was opening from the shore, so I don't think you are quite correct. Given that the nearest land to the east was over 1.5 NM away, then Sola was relatively close to the western shore.

Originally Posted by Terje Vigen

It was not the 3 northbound vessels that hindered the tanker from sailing further east before turning north, this was done according to the planned route of the tanker, pre-plotted in the tanker's ECDIS, and duly discussed and agreed upon between the captain and the pilot beforehand.

The report said the 3 northbound ships were to port in the channel, but in my estimation the distance between the land points in their vicinity was 1.5 NM, but there is a marked rock 0.5 from the eastern side - making the channel 1.0NM wide and from the reproduction of Sola's radar picture, it appears to me that they were just to stbd of the centre of that channel, but that would mean they were passing about 1/2 mile from the western shore. Sola was inside of their path, but converging on it.

Originally Posted by Terje Vigen

The Investigation Board did indeed discuss the route followed by tanker, see chapter 2.5.6 of their report.

The route was in accordance with common, well established practice of tankers sailing out from this oil terminal:

Actually they made a point of saying that common practice had changed with the advent of AIS, with more and more traffic choosing to trim a little distance off their voyage by driving up the wrong side of the channel.

Originally Posted by Terje Vigen

The common practice of tankers leaving the Sture Oil Terminal is to follow the shortest route northwards and then westwards out to sea. (See Fibure 41 from the report below). This is done to avoid having to build up speed on on the huge loaded tankers on an easterly course, approaching land on the eastern side of the fjord quite close ahead - and having to cross the main north/south fairway with its quite dense shipping traffic twice.

The Accident Investigation Board concluded that this was possibly the most safe routing, despite the fact that it is on the western side of the fjord. Furthermore, the Investigation Board explained that it was highly questionable if a TSS north of the Sture Oil Terminal would improve the overall safety.

What a crock. It's over 2 miles to the other side of the channel, and if a course of about 020° was taken out of the terminal, there's 5 NM of room to accelerate and a small course alteration to exit the fjord.

It's curious that the report seems to think that a VTS would not make it safer - quite frankly they don't need a VTS, but a couple of fairway buoys (one 1000 yards east of the Sture safety zone and another a couple miles north of it) would keep these collisions from happening, while adding negligibly to the distance these ships will be travelling.

They're just lucky this was a piddly little warship with only a little fuel oil to spill. If it had been another tanker with a faulty AIS this would have been an Exxon Valdez-level environmental disaster.