Well Done Norway! US Navy take notes!

[IslandHopper]

Originally Posted by Snore

????? If the Bearing does not change your gonna crash. Be it approaching from astern, side or head-on.

The example I give students/newbies is imagine you are walking towards a door. The two sides of the door frame will increase in angle as you approach. If one does not increase in angle- you will hit it.

Try it out

The relative change in Bearing will even tell you what side you are closer to.

Fixed....

If i ever used the term Angle instead of Bearing when doing collision avoidance exercises/exams at collage i would have been resitting all until i got it right....

[Snore]

Originally Posted by IslandHopper

Fixed....



If i ever used the term Angle instead of Bearing when doing collision avoidance exercises/exams at collage i would have been resitting all until i got it right....

Sigh —- yes in a pure sense you are right.

When trying to explain this to someone who is foreign to the concept. It is simply more expedient to explain it is an angle.

[requiem]

Originally Posted by ArmyDaveNY

Good points. We also don't know what the previous watch told the new watch nor how long after the watch changed the collision occurred. At least I don't recall it being mentioned in the video.

It is possible that the previous watch stated the lights were a pier and the new watch didn't verify the info, or was distracted by other info more immediate in nature. Either way it was a big mistake.

I downloaded the whole report to see if it contained any other information. This excerpt speaks a bit to that question:

From 03:45 to 03:53, the relieving OOW and the OOW being relieved went through the handover procedure on the bridge.
...
The OOWs also discussed the traffic in the fairway. On the port side of the frigate’s course line, three northbound vessels were approaching. These were acquired on the frigate’s radar along with one vessel heading in the same direction as the frigate. The navigation officers also discussed a stationary object at or near the Sture Terminal, which was giving off a great deal of light to starboard of the frigate’s course line. The two OOWs stood around the radar (MFD7 1; see Figure 3) and discussed whether the ‘object’ could be the terminal’s quay, or possibly a fish farm or rig/platform. The OOWs have stated that the ‘object’ transmitted AIS signals, but no speed vector, and that they assumed that it was stationary. The ‘object’ was therefore not tracked on the frigate’s radar. The OOWs’ statements differ somewhat: The OOW being relieved had observed two AIS signals and pressed one of them and read ‘Sola TS’. The relieving OOW had seen a blue mark and interpreted this to be an AIS signal from a fixed installation and not from one or two vessels.” (page 16)

So, the radar was on, AIS was also functioning, and someone actually looked at it. Table 3 (page 49) shows the various AIS symbols discussed. Section 2.3.2.7 (bottom of page 116) discusses a bit of the cognitive complications at play. The radio contact between the two ships took place around 04:00, and the collision just after 04:01.

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by requiem

I downloaded the whole report to see if it contained any other information. This excerpt speaks a bit to that question:



So, the radar was on, AIS was also functioning, and someone actually looked at it. Table 3 (page 49) shows the various AIS symbols discussed. Section 2.3.2.7 (bottom of page 116) discusses a bit of the cognitive complications at play. The radio contact between the two ships took place around 04:00, and the collision just after 04:01.

Thanks for the timeline summary.

One other thing mentioned in the Video was that the young Navy crew immediately got into training exercises upon taking over the watch.,

This I assume, was part of the Captains night orders and would need to be logged as completed, thus making them a priority for the OOW? .

Were those ordered tasks detrimental and a distraction from maintaining a proper and safe watch?

[requiem]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

Thanks for the timeline summary.

One other thing mentioned in the Video was that the young Navy crew immediately got into training exercises upon taking over the watch.,

This I assume, was part of the Captains night orders and would need to be logged as completed, thus making them a priority for the OOW? .

Were those ordered tasks detrimental and a distraction from maintaining a proper and safe watch?

No night order book:

A captain’s night order book was not kept on ‘HNoMS Helge Ingstad’, but the Commanding Officer (CO) gave instructions both during the planning phase and en route (see section 1.2.1.1), which were communicated in connection with the officer of the watch handovers. No joint review of the route (fairway review) was carried out with all the navigators before the inshore voyage commenced. The relieving OOW and the OOWT had both reviewed their part of the voyage route the night before the accident (page 54)

As to training being a distraction, almost certainly it reduced the bridge team's capacity, but I'm not sure how significant a role it had. The report mentions "The training of the OOWT/OOWAT focused on checking the frigate’s position on the electronic chart display (ECDIS4) using optical navigation aids." My guess is that it played a more minor role. The summary lists various factors, and I think this one was the primary problem: "Based on a firmly lodged situational awareness that the ‘object’ was stationary and that the passage was under control, little use was made of the radar and AIS to monitor the fairway." The greatest chance to correct this lay in the radio communications, which were also poor. (Tenerife was mentioned upthread, I think, and that's a most apt comparison.)

[captainmarknc]

The average age of the crew on the bridge was 22. Can you imagine that? From my understanding, there was inadequate communications between navigational (bridge) personnel. The radar man, for instance, failed to track nor communicate the oncoming ship and did not know how close to shore he could approach nor which side of the channel to stay in? Shipping channels in narrow passageways are clearly marked on charts.

Someone in the navy said it was also due to promoting officers too quickly in order to comply with anti discrimination policies. This may seem misogynistic to some yet may have actually played a role regardless of your view.

It seems that the captain of the frigate bears some responsibility for not having an experienced bridge officer on the bridge.

[ArmyDaveNY]

Originally Posted by requiem

I downloaded the whole report to see if it contained any other information. This excerpt speaks a bit to that question:

So, the radar was on, AIS was also functioning, and someone actually looked at it. Table 3 (page 49) shows the various AIS symbols discussed. Section 2.3.2.7 (bottom of page 116) discusses a bit of the cognitive complications at play. The radio contact between the two ships took place around 04:00, and the collision just after 04:01.

This is good information and thanks for posting it.

The excerpt mentions that the Sola TS, at one point, was not indicating a speed. If I am reading this correctly, it seems the Sola TS was stationary, and then left. It also seems the bridge was not aware that the situation changed, and for some reason assumed that it would continue to remain as they first saw it when they took over.

Interestingly, this is not unusual even in non nautical situations. I saw this in the Army too. We would get a briefing on where various obstacles or other units were and people sometimes assumed that nothing would change.

If one reads accident reports for both ships and aviation, this is sometimes the case too.

[houseofcharm]

And I thought this was going to be the old 'why does the Norwegian navy have bar codes on their ships' tale.

[Lake-Effect]

One thing that strikes me from reading all of this (and I really don't want to create further overreliance on technology, but ) ... we have face recognition and motion analysis and autonomous vehicles - all of which involve complex calculations in real-time... by comparison, ships are large, and move and manoevre relatively slower for their size, and much good information about position and course is continuously available (AIS, radar).

So why isn't there in place a system that can take all this in, compare courses and identify when a collision is possible or imminent? It seems this would be a tremendous help at the traffic control centres.

[captainmarknc]

Originally Posted by Lake-Effect

One thing that strikes me from reading all of this (and I really don't want to create further overreliance on technology, but ) ... we have face recognition and motion analysis and autonomous vehicles - all of which involve complex calculations in real-time... by comparison, ships are large, and move and manoevre relatively slower for their size, and much good information about position and course is continuously available (AIS, radar).

So why isn't there in place a system that can take all this in, compare courses and identify when a collision is possible or imminent? It seems this would be a tremendous help at the traffic control centres.

One obvious reason is stealth, especially for the Navy. But in these busy shipping channels, stealth is not a good idea.

[capn_billl]

3+ USA military vessels have been involved in similar collisions in recent years.

EVERYONE needs to be taking notes here.

[requiem]

Originally Posted by Lake-Effect

So why isn't there in place a system that can take all this in, compare courses and identify when a collision is possible or imminent? It seems this would be a tremendous help at the traffic control centres.

There are such systems! In this case, AIS or radar tracking would normally trigger an alarm when it detects a CPA within 0.5 miles in the next 6 minutes. Similarly, the ship has the ability to automatically start tracking of AIS or radar contacts within defined zones.

However, and you'll likely have encountered this if you have radar on your own boat, this isn't something find useful inside a harbor, as you'd be getting alarms for everything, whether it be a breakwater or a moored boat. Thus, the automatic tracking systems are normally switched off on inshore trips.

In this case, with the automatic tracking system off, the frigate would have needed to manually initiate tracking of Sola TS. Between the new OOW not realizing it was a ship, and not knowing it was departing its berth, this didn't happen and so no CPA or proximity alarms triggered.

[MJH]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

Less than a year after the Navy collision with a Tanker, an excellent report and lessons for all of us is produced.
Video definitely worth watching

https://gcaptain.com/investigation-v...on-must-watch/

I have always considered the reading of official accident investigation reports a requirement of all professionals (air and sea) as a high price has been paid in dollars and lives where valuable lessons can be learned.

My first take is to strongly recognize that the loss of visibility (darkness, rain, fog) creates its own challenges particularly in high traffic areas. We are dirt-based creatures very dependent on what we visually feed our brains. No matter how good or experienced we may think we are and whatever the situation, our abilities will be tasked a lot harder...and that must be recognized and accounted for with an extra level of caution.

~ ~ _/) ~ ~ MJH

[fabgo]

I am still amazed that this accident happened. Even though HI didn't turn on their AIS, Sola TS did, and therefore should show up as a target on HI's displays.

Then there is the fact that HI did not have a good understanding of their own position, which a quick glance at a chart plotter would have confirmed.

I suspect HI must have been navigating by sight alone, ignoring all instruments and navigation aids, which I find pretty astounding. Especially considering it was night-time.

[Cadence]

Since most or the readers here, are boaters yachtsmen if you prefer, what makes it scary is with your speed it would leave you in deep **** had you been the oiler. Your Clorox bottle would not even be seen on radar.