Loss of KELAERIN Rescue of Crew June 2018

[Tillsbury]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

The mindset that crew stay on deck to somehow drive the boat out of danger, when a tempest is about, is one of the most dangerous fallacies of heavy weather risk management.

....that leaving crew on deck when the real possibility of heavy green water sweeping the deck is justified, prioritizes the boat over human life.

All you can do ahead of storm warnings, is to minimize your windage, secure all openings and loose items on board, secure rudder and minimize any surfing momentum, before going down below to wait it out.

Whatever happens to the boat during the storm, you will be in better shape afterwards to deal with it, vs facing serious injury by staying on deck.

I absolutely agree. I’m not sure I’d classify running under bare poles at 4-5 knots “comfortable”. I’d call it one step away from “ooer”. I’d be securing everything I could, and in the words of Skip Novak “going down below for a cup of tea”.

[Pelagic]

I have never thought about making an easy parachute or drouge system for the bow before.

I just wonder if anyone has ever tried combining their primary anchor and deploying all chain with an attachable storm parachute as a sea anchor?

This keeps your bow to breaking seas, reduces weight dramatically at the bow and with windlass, keeps the parachute holding in deep water and makes it much easier to retrieve afterwards...

I'm sure it must have been tried, but I have no knowledge of this being discussed.

[Paul L]

Originally Posted by Dockhead

Sure, but if he had wavered, I bet the CG swimmer would not have just left him there, for all the reasons explained very well by Cyan.

The skipper is a very experienced trans-ocean tug captain with many rescues under his belt. If he had said give me the dewatering pump and we are staying, they would not have jumped into the Pacific to ride the stretcher up. There certainly wasn't time to argue.
What I said about the CG not coercing them to leave is what the skipper told me when I asked.

[Dockhead]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

The mindset that crew stay on deck to somehow drive the boat out of danger, when a tempest is about, is one of the most dangerous fallacies of heavy weather risk management.

....that leaving crew on deck when the real possibility of heavy green water sweeping the deck is justified, prioritizes the boat over human life.

All you can do ahead of storm warnings, is to minimize your windage, secure all openings and loose items on board, secure rudder and minimize any surfing momentum, before going down below to wait it out.

Whatever happens to the boat during the storm, you will be in better shape afterwards to deal with it, vs facing serious injury by staying on deck.

Well, at some point, sure, but what is that point? Surely there is a lot of benefit from steering the boat actively when running off during weather which does not require a drogue.

My plan for dealing with really dangerous weather with a significant risk of getting green water in the cockpit is to deploy the drogue (not even made yet, but the cones are sitting in my cabin), lash down the rudder, and go below, as is recommended. But in this case we still had some sail up (a bit of jib out to keep the CE for forward) and were jogging along nicely at 6 knots or so, under good control, with the on-deck crew tethered in the cockpit with orders not to leave the cockpit.

I think Snowy Petrel's point is that these events are rather unpredictable.

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by Paul L

The skipper is a very experienced trans-ocean tug captain with many rescues under his belt. If he had said give me the dewatering pump and we are staying, they would not have jumped into the Pacific to ride the stretcher up. There certainly wasn't time to argue.
What I said about the CG not coercing them to leave is what the skipper told me when I asked.

Hi Paul,
My background and experiences professionally are very similar to the skipper.

I believe serious fatigue and injuries to himself were a major part of his decision, as it would have been with me.

You have to wonder if he had been safe and resting down below when they experienced the same knockdown, would they both have been in better shape (mentally and physically) to apply thier considerable experience to go that last 200 or so, miles?

That is the point, I keep trying to make [emoji4]

[cyan]

Originally Posted by Paul L

What I said about the CG not coercing them to leave is what the skipper told me when I asked.

We can all appreciate the inside info, thanks.
'Seems tike the captain made the right call, coersion notwithstanding.

Either way, I don't think the CG could LEGALLY leave an older fellow with a gash on his head on a crippled boat with a less-abled wife, both of them wet and cold, low on food maybe no water... no matter HOW experienced he was. Leaving them a big pump and a few Cliff bars and bottles of water would condemn a banged-up elderly couple on the edge of hypothermia to do many hours of manual labor just to have a chance to survive. Can't see it, even out of professional courtesy.

[Paul L]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

Hi Paul,
My background and experiences professionally are very similar to the skipper.

I believe serious fatigue and injuries to himself were a major part of his decision, as it would have been with me.

You have to wonder if he had been safe and resting down below when they experienced the same knockdown, would they both have been in better shape (mentally and physically) to apply thier considerable experience to go that last 200 or so, miles?

That is the point, I keep trying to make [emoji4]

It's a good point. Without the fatigue of the passage and conditions, the soaking wet, bone chilling cold and face full of blood, decisions might have been different. So even though it goes against my instincts, not having a watch might have been safer. Although it still isn't clear that the initial conditions warranted this while approaching a coast with major shipping and fishing.

[Paul L]

Originally Posted by cyan

We can all appreciate the inside info, thanks.
'Seems tike the captain made the right call, coersion notwithstanding.

Either way, I don't think the CG could LEGALLY leave an older fellow with a gash on his head on a crippled boat with a less-abled wife, both of them wet and cold, low on food maybe no water... no matter HOW experienced he was. Leaving them a big pump and a few Cliff bars and bottles of water would condemn a banged-up elderly couple on the edge of hypothermia to do many hours of manual labor just to have a chance to survive. Can't see it, even out of professional courtesy.

Could be. Maybe there's a Coastie flight crew on here who could comment. It'll have to be a different incident to see in practice.

[DumnMad]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

All you can do ahead of storm warnings, is to minimize your windage, secure all openings and loose items on board, secure rudder and minimize any surfing momentum, before going down below to wait it out.

Not sure what you mean by this but I understand the official enquirey into the fastnet storm said:
Those who adopted active tactics in the storm seemed to come off better than those who didn't.

[estarzinger]

for me, there would have been one definite trigger to change tactics - which is that they were no longer making course, instead 'losing ground' to the south. That by itself would have caused me to go into whatever the best turtle tactic I had available. Then you could have rested/fed/etc, which is valuable in and of itself when about to close with the shore. And no reason to lose ground any faster than absolutely necessary, particularly as that can be a damn difficult coast to have to make northing up. They were just about the exact distance off for this to be a decently prudent course of action, close enough they can get in with 24 hours of the weather clearing but far enough off to be well out of the main traffic - it is just about exactly where you would have chosen (if given a choice) to rest up.

I also can suggest there were probably prior signs of 'bad wave shapes'; they might be subtle to read, but every time I was ever popped real hard I could identify an earlier sign that I should have listened to. I do suppose there is always a 'first time' and an exception to the rule . . . . but I never saw it.

[kmacdonald]

I hope the life raft champions take note. This is just one of the many examples of life rafts being lost or blow away in bad weather. In fair weather the dinghy would be fine. The importance of weather routing can't be overstated.

[Mare Nostrum]

Hi Steadman,

Thanks for your post. You say that "they WERE experienced cruisers." I would submit that they ARE STILL EXPERIENCED Cruisers! Very much so!!!

Thank God they survived...and I'm sure that we can all learn much from their story. I can only barely imagine how disappointed and sad they are after losing KELAERIN...
Perhaps she will be recovered and restored!

[Paul L]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

.......
I also can suggest there were probably prior signs of 'bad wave shapes'; they might be subtle to read, but every time I was ever popped real hard I could identify an earlier sign that I should have listened to. I do suppose there is always a 'first time' and an exception to the rule . . . . but I never saw it.

3am with almost no moon and cloud cover doesn't make it easier.

[estarzinger]

Originally Posted by Paul L

3am with almost no moon and cloud cover doesn't make it easier.

mmmmm . . . yes, I'v been there, my comment stands. Usually, the 'sign' in fact was more feel than sight.

being able to function at 3 am is necessary seamanship. Around that is usually when the bad stuff happens.

[Snowpetrel]

Originally Posted by DumnMad

Not sure what you mean by this but I understand the official enquirey into the fastnet storm said:
Those who adopted active tactics in the storm seemed to come off better than those who didn't.

That was in a time when the prevailiing 'passive' tactic was to lie ahull. Also the bigger faster boats missed the worst of it. It was the small half tonners that really took the brunt of the storm.