U.S. Navy ship goes aground due to bad charts

[GordMay]

“... The Digital Nautical Charts (DNC) used by the Guardian and most Navy ships are produced by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), a largely secret organization headquartered in Springfield,Va.

The DNC charts come in several versions. “General” and “coastal” versions are used in open areas such as the Sulu Sea, and “approach” and “harbor” versions are used for operating in and around harbors. According to an NGA memo sent to the Navy on Jan. 18, the error was in the coastal DNC, apparently in use on board the Guardian at the time of the grounding.

The general DNC and hardcopy charts show the reef’s location correctly, NGA said.

Letitia Long, the agency’s director, told the Navy that the coastal DNC chart for the Sulu Sea would be corrected by Jan. 30, and advised ships not to use DNC coastal charts in the area until then.

The Navy’s head navigator took things a step further, advising in a message sent to the fleet Jan. 18 “to operate with caution when using NGA-supplied Coastal Digital Nautical Charts due to an identified error in the accuracy of charting in the Sulu Sea.”

Rear Adm. Jonathan White, Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy, said in the message that preliminary analysis of the error indicates it “resulted from incorrect geographic rectification of satellite imagery used to build” the coastal DNC charts.

“NGA has found no other anomalies, but is currently conducting a comprehensive review of its source data,” White said in the message.

He cautioned Navy ships “to compare coastal DNC charts with general DNC library charts, and not rely on [a] single source for navigation data.

“Commanding officers,” White added, “are directed to report any anomalies immediately to NGA.”

The agency expects to complete its review of all coastal DNC charts by Jan. 22, White noted. ...”

➥ Stranded Navy minesweeper taking on water - Navy News | News from Afghanistan & Iraq - Navy Times

[sidmon]

Well. Well...

The "Modern Sirens" have bagged another boatload of unwary souls.

What I said here (and widely mischaracterized and derided by some folks in this venue) still applies...

As long as the significant human factors threat that has attended the evolution and widespread usage of electronic navigation remains unrecognized, or blown off with the hubristic notion that "they were just stupid...glad I'm not", then we will have the opportunity to discuss another of these puzzling cases in the not too distant future.

Before anyone starts in to frame this as a call to return to the stone age...Let me say that I just installed a new chart plotter -replacing an older model- on my own little plastic toy boat. And yes. It is integrated with the autopilot.

So what is this human factors threat? It is one of cognition. For the first time since the Polynesians and their forebears took to the sea in open canoes, the process of navigation no longer requires significant mental effort to derive a fix. Now we just expect the box (Modern Siren that it is...) to ceaselessly provide us with perfect information. And 99 point some odd per cent of the time it does.

Very quickly, we become inured to the threat of error, and we will let the age old aspects of uncertainty atrophy before we are even aware of it. After all. How could that pretty presentation on the screen be wrong?

But whatever. Flame away.

We will have the opportunity to revisit when the next case like this one happens, and every one is asking:

HOW COULD THIS HAPPPEN?!?!?!

Until then.

cheers

[nes]

Originally Posted by The Garbone

Looking at the map and if they had just left Manila i would bet they were trying to make a quick run across the line to get their shellback.

Ok, so from Manila to the equator at the closest point is about 1,000 nm one way. If that was what they were doing, then it will be even worse for the Capt, and crew. They might have been headed somewhere that made this an option, but not a 1,000+nm detour.

[sidmon]

Originally Posted by nes

Ok, so from Manila to the equator at the closest point is about 1,000 nm one way. If that was what they were doing, then it will be even worse for the Capt, and crew. They might have been headed somewhere that made this an option, but not a 1,000+nm detour.

USN ships transits at sea are very precisely programmed. A skipper does not have the latitude to just head for the equator for a quickie crossing the line ceremony.

The USN is in the process of spearheading the US military's "pivot" to SE Asia as the Middle East conflicts wind down.

For those interested in the context of why the Guardian was where she was can do well to read here and follow the included links.

[sidmon]

Might add too, the South China Sea has been long known for its navigation hazards...



What it took to the get the Frank Knox off Pratus reef here

[sidmon]

Also...

Since the adoption of ECDIS, the incidence of high profile USN groundings has actually increased...

[hellosailor]

So, no one else has heard rumours that those reefs were in fact moved to their new positions by the Iranian Reef Restoration Agency, as part of Iran's nuclear non-proliferation program?

[S/V Alchemy]

Originally Posted by sidmon

Well. Well...

The "Modern Sirens" have bagged another boatload of unwary souls.

You are correct in noting you're not going to be popular, but you are also correct in being correct.

Am I to assume the Navy no longer posts watch crew outside the video arcade that is the modern bridge? Eyes, the poor, antiquated things, are not customarily aimed forward?

There is no mention of it so far, just talk of "bad charts". Reminds me of the boat that barged us at the line from another start: "Where did YOU come from?" the Skipper of S/V Wrong Way wanted to know.

You have to be able to read start flags and work a watch in lowly club racing, not just your plotter. Who here has heard breakers on a beach in the fog and realized a 90 degree turn was in order? "Accept all inputs" is a good rule in navigation, even for the big boys.

[zeehag]

when i used to live in san diego i learned the navy didnt need charts or bad charts as an excuse to run their ships aground.

[hellosailor]

"Am I to assume the Navy no longer posts watch crew outside"
Can't assume the SOP would be in effect at any given time. For instance, on the battleships all personnel had to be cleared from the decks before firing the main guns, or they'd be killed from concussion.
In the new navy, all decks will still be cleared during CBN drills when the ship is sealed very much the same as a submarine.
I'm still thinking "minesweeper" crew won't be the most experienced in the Navy, and they won't be chosen for their near-shore prowess and experience. Breakers? No, really, is there any reason to expect they'd have had any experience with breakers before?
They might well have been expecting pirates and jihadis in small boats to be the only threat out there, the only thing they were concerned with.

Like we're to believe how simply a guy who was upset with his girlfriend managed to set a nuclear submarine on fire in drydock last year? And totalled out a whole submarine?

[zeehag]

was a gas to hear about constellation grounding off zuniga when she was still commissioned and based out of sd..lol....doesnt take much....

[sidmon]

Originally Posted by S/V Alchemy

Am I to assume the Navy no longer posts watch crew outside the video arcade that is the modern bridge? Eyes, the poor, antiquated things, are not customarily aimed forward?

There is no mention of it so far, just talk of "bad charts". Reminds me of the boat that barged us at the line from another start: "Where did YOU come from?" the Skipper of S/V Wrong Way wanted to know.

You have to be able to read start flags and work a watch in lowly club racing, not just your plotter. Who here has heard breakers on a beach in the fog and realized a 90 degree turn was in order? "Accept all inputs" is a good rule in navigation, even for the big boys.

Due to a concerted effort to reduce ship manning over the last decade, the USN reduced the required number of lookouts aboard ship. A ship the size of the Guardian likely only had one...If any, and the bridge watch also tasked to maintain the functions of "proper lookout".

One thing to mention for those who have not been in the USN environment (I am second generation USN -dad was air ops and later XO of the Coral Sea which was at Yankee Station when the Frank Knox stranded herself...And I spent 10 years going to sea when on active duty. More as a navigator on seismic exploration ships.) is that everyone on that bridge was acutely aware of what would befall them in the event of a grounding. The conning officer(s) in particular.

After a decade of these groundings and other incidents (several high profile collisions), they knew all too well the trouble that would befall them. While the average pleasure boater may feel embarrassed having to pick up the radio and hail TowBoat US and the phone to the insurance company, its nothing compared to the pit in your stomach you get having to sit across the green table cloth facing the stern gents at a Board of Inquiry (I know from the experience of being a witness at one) and wondering if they are going to recommend a Court Martial.

So bottom line is, the people on the bridge of the Guardian the other night were very certainly doing all they thought they were supposed to do to safely navigate the ship.

Obviously, that wasn't good enough.

So those who are quick to be smug and chalk it up to gross negligence or stupidity are more than most likely way off the mark.

So what happened? We don't know yet. But we do know the USN has already discovered an error in the relevant DNC chart. Ok. All well and good...

But check out what the latest SOLAS guidelines to ECDIS training stress ...

"It is important that traditional navigation skills are not forgotten or lost.
Navigators should become confident, but not overconfident, in the use of
ECDIS. There is a danger that some navigation officers will increasingly
trust what is displayed on the screen without question, which could lull
them into a false sense of security. As with all electronic equipment,

ECDIS is an aid to navigation, albeit a very significant one,

but it is not a substitute for maintaining a proper lookout at all times."

[not my emphasis]

Did the bridge watch of the Guardian know they were near a dangerous reef system? Were they placing too much confidence in their ECDIS?

Given the experience of the USS San Francisco, USS Arleigh Burke, USS Port Royal, you can see there is a consistent issue with coming to grips with fully "integrating" electronic navigation systems with the basic principles of "Navigation and Pilotage"....

And I suspect that system "Siren" was aboard the Guardian that fateful night...

Oh, and yes, now that sophisticated electronic navigation systems have found their way into pleasure boats like ours...

Be prepared to ponder more of this:

(Condolences to the families...)

[ohdrinkboy]

Originally Posted by hellosailor

So, no one else has heard rumours that those reefs were in fact moved to their new positions by the Iranian Reef Restoration Agency, as part of Iran's nuclear non-proliferation program?

Are you saying Iran has RMDs (reefs of mass destruction)?

No matter what, the captain is screwed.

[Lake-Effect]

Originally Posted by sidmon

So bottom line is, the people on the bridge of the Guardian the other night were very certainly doing all they thought they were supposed to do to safely navigate the ship.

Obviously, that wasn't good enough.

So those who are quick to be smug and chalk it up to gross negligence or stupidity are more than most likely way off the mark.

What were they doing navigating through an internationally-recognized preserve?

Assuming the skipper doesn't buy his own charts at West Marine, who would have been responsible for including (or not) the indication of this protected area on their charts?

[sidmon]

Originally Posted by Lake-Effect

What were they doing navigating through an internationally-recognized preserve?

Assuming the skipper doesn't buy his own charts at West Marine, who would have been responsible for including (or not) the indication of this protected area on their charts?

They dont.

The operation of the ship in the area was directed by the staff of Commander 7th Fleet...Which would have directed the mission she was on and other broad guidelines.

With the PIM (Position of Intended Movement) and other transit and exercise details being first "chopped" by the ISIC (Immediate Superior In Charge) -this would have been first drawn up by the ship's navigator and initially chopped by the CO of the Guardian, then forwarded to the ISIC-and given the tenderbox nature in the region, likely final chop by C7F.

The ISIC is responsible for making sure she had all the required charts aboard as well.