USNavy Report on Fitzgerald Collision.

[Dockhead]

I am interested in the PROCESS of collision avoidance, which is used by the USN. The articles, written by non-mariners, make it sound like it's nothing more than "See that over there? Looks dangerous. Let's speed up and dodge over here." I don't believe that can possibly be an accurate reflection of how they do it, or at least, how they are supposed to do it.


On the merchant ships I know about, you have certain decision points at certain ranges, and I believe that commonly watchkeepers are supposed to complete their assessment of the risks of any given target by 10 miles out.



Even on my little vessel, we make it a rule to never let any vessel get within 10 miles of us without being aware of it (that's first of all!!), and without having figured out whether it presents a potential collision risk or not.



As collision risks develop, we assess CPA and TCPA and the geometry of the crossing, so that we are prepared to make a decision at the right time (usually 3 miles if we are stand-on).



I would think that on a warship which is designed to battle other surface vessels, that kind of situational awareness and this kind of systematic decision making would be pretty elementary, and pretty fundamental to a warship functioning as a warship. I would think that if you are engaged in a battle with hostile surface vessels you would have quite similar tasks -- maintaining awareness of all targets which are presenting a risk of getting close enough to shoot at you; making assessments in a systematic way so that decisions about shooting or maneuvering are made in time. There must be a ton of training and procedures involved, to get a crew ready for fighting multiple hostile surface vessels at once.



So how could it be, that such a vessel has no process for making sure that the bridge is systematically aware of NON-HOSTILE vessels in its vicinity? I just don't believe that could be so.


If it is so, then it's really not the captain's fault -- the whole system of running the ship is improperly designed. And certainly would have nothing to do with the crew being tired or incompetent. Unless there is missing information, they weren't doing it badly - they weren't doing it at all.


I wonder what it's like in other navies? The RN?

[Uricanejack]

Originally Posted by Dockhead

I am interested in the PROCESS of collision avoidance, which is used by the USN. The articles, written by non-mariners, make it sound like it's nothing more than "See that over there? Looks dangerous. Let's speed up and dodge over here." I don't believe that can possibly be an accurate reflection of how they do it, or at least, how they are supposed to do it.


On the merchant ships I know about, you have certain decision points at certain ranges, and I believe that commonly watchkeepers are supposed to complete their assessment of the risks of any given target by 10 miles out.



Even on my little vessel, we make it a rule to never let any vessel get within 10 miles of us without being aware of it (that's first of all!!), and without having figured out whether it presents a potential collision risk or not.



As collision risks develop, we assess CPA and TCPA and the geometry of the crossing, so that we are prepared to make a decision at the right time (usually 3 miles if we are stand-on).



I would think that on a warship which is designed to battle other surface vessels, that kind of situational awareness and this kind of systematic decision making would be pretty elementary, and pretty fundamental to a warship functioning as a warship. I would think that if you are engaged in a battle with hostile surface vessels you would have quite similar tasks -- maintaining awareness of all targets which are presenting a risk of getting close enough to shoot at you; making assessments in a systematic way so that decisions about shooting or maneuvering are made in time. There must be a ton of training and procedures involved, to get a crew ready for fighting multiple hostile surface vessels at once.



So how could it be, that such a vessel has no process for making sure that the bridge is systematically aware of NON-HOSTILE vessels in its vicinity? I just don't believe that could be so.


If it is so, then it's really not the captain's fault -- the whole system of running the ship is improperly designed. And certainly would have nothing to do with the crew being tired or incompetent. Unless there is missing information, they weren't doing it badly - they weren't doing it at all.


I wonder what it's like in other navies? The RN?

I am also mystified by Naval process and routine.
The differences are in the No of people involved in the process, how they communicate rather than the specific technicalities.
How does the team work? There are a lot more members of the team on a naval vessel and the division of tasks is diffrent.
The problem here was partly how the individuals were performing thier particular trask.
Partly how they passed on the information to the decision maker.
Overall. Who was in charge and what requirements or standard operating procedures were supposed to be along with specific Standing orders from the Capt. Ultimately the planing of the passage and specific night orders specific to the passage being conducted.
This is where the Capt dropped the Ball.

It’s often referred to as Bridge or Crew Resource Managment.

Your presumption have a lot of misunderstanding of the process for commercial vessels. Doing it by the numbers is unlikely.

Most well run ships will not use specifics, most will use general principles and allow the OOW to use good judgement.
Each situation developed uniquely. The decision point are on a well managed vessel are not specific but fluid responding to a variety of situations.

To put it very simply out in the middle of the ocean would be completely diffrent to transiting a busy TSS. Or arrival at a Pilot station.
A commercial vessel may have only 1 individual doing everything or in the case of a large Cruise ship. Possible 6 or even more in busy pilotage waters.
What might be reasonable in some situation would be quite unreasonable in others.

Who is doing what becomes important particularly who has the Con. The Navy terminology confuses me it’s clearly diffrent with 4 officers involved.

The young lady on the Bridge had what I would refer to as the watch and conduct of the vessel. Ie she is the shot caller.
She has a junior officer who she is partly training and who is giving the con.
Meanwhile down bellow there is an operations rooom with at two officers who are supposed to be providing the bridge with updates and information.
Who don’t actual have input to directing the vessel.
Which is strange to me.

This isn’t the best example for trying to figure out what they are supposed to be doing. They clearly were doing it the way it was supposed to be carried out.

Why unknown. 22 hours still on duty fatigue must have played a big role with the whole team.

I read the article. Not an investigation. But a news story. Putting names and a story to individuals.
I get the impression tiered over worked a bit out of thier depth trying to do things right with probably a lot of pressures I have never felt. Given poor direction by thier boss. And ultimately left to do something critical when very tired with out the support of a senior experienced officer.

Unfortunately she made some critical errors and did not receive the kind of support and back up which would have caught those errors. She should have been better supported. The article suggests trust between members of the team was an issue.

I would not be surprised if most young women do find it tougher than most young men to be accepted in those roles. Did it play a role who knows.

I know people died. Even so I feel sorry for the young officers on watch. They will never get over this event. Thier lives have been ruined as well.

After reading the article. My opinion.
Thier commanding officer. Overworked them for no good reason. Exhausted them beyond most industrial limits. Gave them with a poor plan to execute. With poor orders. And went to bed because he was tired. And left them to it.

He wasn’t called. According to his orders. Why not?
My guess. due to the officer who should have called him anticipating a negative reaction. Unfortunately not unusual or restricted to any particular navy or commercial operation.

It’s very poor situation when junior officers are afraid or reluctant to make call. It’s unfortunately not uncommon.
Putting a specific restriction on course deviation is not a good plan. Eg call me if deviation 1000 yards.
Might be well intentioned. Signals lack of trust. Gets interspersed as I better not deviate more than 1000 yards.

Note the OOD dismissing report of crystal as passing 1500 yards astern.

For two large ships doing close to 20 knots. 1500 yards would be regarded as inadequate by most large vessels. This was an intent to pass significantly less than a mile ahead of the container ship.

For the container ship this should have set off some significant level of concern much sooner.

[Pete7]

Originally Posted by Dockhead

I wonder what it's like in other navies? The RN?

Sadly no unique to the USN. Someone on watch on your yacht has far more information available to them than the OOW in charge of this. Not helped when the crew down below who could see the situation developing and repeatedly advised the OOW who ignored them. His decisions weren't based on any information, he didn't have any, nor did he have any appreciation of were he was.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotla...lands-11605365

[jmh2002]

I will make a small comment with similar thoughts to what I wrote in other threads about merchant vessels running in to each other (which also happens pretty often too, among other incidents - if you wish to be further shocked/entertained here is another maritime news website full of such incidents: http://maritimebulletin.net)

My small comment is that despite the myriad of mitigating circumstances leading to these events, all of these accidents seem to be mostly just fundamental watchkeeping and/or navigational errors with really no excuse.

They are simply human error from people doing just plain stupid stuff (incompetence, falling asleep, drunk, playing on phone, etc, etc - or not even knowing the colregs) and happen with quite some regularity.

In the case of the Fitzgerald, whilst there are many mitigating circumstances there is really no excuse for the basics:

- not performing a sufficient lookout on the starboard (danger side) in heavy traffic
- not having the radar tuned properly and not tracking targets properly
- not also tracking AIS targets and overlaying and comparing them to the radar, the chart, and the & visual lookout
(never rely solely on 1 source of navigation info)
- not taking early action to avoid a collision situation arising
- and not even just slowing down while any 'uncertainty' was resolved

^^^ I mean, come on, really... ?

Sadly it seems that even after the 'extensive training' that a naval officer receives the OOD was simply not sufficiently competent to be 'in charge' of such a vessel at sea. And given the magnitude of basic errors I would even go so far as to say ANY vessel.

Having been Master on several larger vessels capable of running at speeds from 30-50kn I understand the difficulties and how situations develop very quickly (eg: at a closing speed of 70kn with another vessel things can get interesting!).

But this is still absolutely no excuse for not being capable of knowing and doing the fundamental basics that even a small private vessel going 5kn is obliged to know and do.

How hard is it to slow down a bit and/or turn to starboard per the colregs? These very simple actions probably would have avoided the tragic loss of life in this case.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by kmacdonald

Yes, the same Air Force.

Trigger-happy pill-poppers who shoot at friendly forces - you still call them 'excellent'?

The Zumwalt can't go into head seas over 12' without submarining. It's way overweight and they ripped out a lot of the interior, removed paint, and made part of the superstructure out of carbon fiber. Still way overweight, didn't fix the design failure, and it still doesn't even have any weapons systems. Didn't they say it was the most expensive ship in the Navy? I'm sure it will be staffed with a fledgling crew and sent out on a "secret mission" with much fanfare. Pray merchant ships avoid it even though they are invisible. I'm just so proud of our Navy.

You know about the new carriers new design catapult system? The one that doesn't work most of the time and their aircraft have to land elsewhere? The old steam powered catapult worked great and was perfected over centuries of use. They got caught in their own "new" mousetrap.

Capital procurement is an excellent example of the problems with first world navies (armies and air forces too) - it is the civilian masters that ultimately at fault - they fund or withhold funding, interfere in the design and procurement processes, and demand a high tempo of operations. The Fitz shows what happens when a ship is poorly-equipped, not maintained, undermanned by undertrained individuals, and pressed with too many demands. And for anyone who pushes back - they'll be fired and replaced by someone who will do as they're told.

[kmacdonald]

Originally Posted by StuM

If the catapult doesn't work, they won't tae off so hos could they land elsewhere?


How do they use the catapult when landing?

When it fails it blocks the runway on occasion. But of course you are right, they can't take off when that happens. A pretty expensive sitting duck.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by Uricanejack

Who is doing what becomes important particularly who has the Con. The Navy terminology confuses me it’s clearly diffrent with 4 officers involved.

You're missing one - on the bridge there was the OOD, the JOOD and the Conning Officer.

The young lady on the Bridge had what I would refer to as the watch and conduct of the vessel. Ie she is the shot caller.
She has a junior officer who she is partly training and who is giving the con.

The JOOD apparently supports the OOD in whatever capacity is required - in this case the JOOD was directed to replace the lookouts. I'm sure she also had other responsibilities, but the way I read the reports, the OOD had the conn. The USN is kind of funny in that they have a conning officer standing behind the helmsman - the OOD makes the conning order, and the Conning officer repeats it to the helmsman. From the article it appeared that the JOOD and Conning officer were both on the port wing for a long period leading up to the collision. The JOOD was tutoring the ConnO (a brand new Ensign) on assessing distance by mark 1 eyeball. A worthwhile exercise, but not at the expense of maintaining the watch. This left the OOD basically alone on the Bridge, juggling everything by herself.

Meanwhile down bellow there is an operations rooom with at two officers who are supposed to be providing the bridge with updates and information.
Who don’t actual have input to directing the vessel.
Which is strange to me.

The CIC (or Ops room) is where the battlespace is managed. There is supposed to be a symbiotic relationship between the Bridge and CIC - the Bridge handles the visual and the safe navigation, the CIC fights the war. This could mean the CIC will give control orders to the Bridge to open firing arcs for weapons, or as countermeasures (anti-torpedo, launching chaff or flares) - the OOD does the conning. There should be a constant flow of information between these two spaces. In peacetime steaming, manning in the CIC is reduced and weapons may be left in standby or turned off. Fewer operators are on staff to operate the sensors. Training is usually going on for the few crew on watch. In this state, the CIC offers another tool to the OOD on the bridge, and should be controlled by the OOD. Generally, depending on the traffic, the OOD should give the radar tracker a control order - "range out to 32 miles, report all contacts with a CPA of 5 miles or less" for example. This would then put long-range radar tracking onto another screen with another set of eyes watching it fulltime, while the OOD could keep the Bridge radar ranged into the 6-12 mile scale and peek at it periodically between visual scans. The close-in tracking of vessels with which there is risk of collision should be performed by the OOD or JOOD on the bridge. They should be taking visual bearings, and if they sight something before they get a radar report from the CIC, then they should be advising the radar tracker - this then clues the tracker into how well the radar is tuned. I assume from the article that on USN ships the radar tracker passes all info through the officer to the bridge; this adds a redundant step that we don't use in the RCN.

I get the impression tiered over worked a bit out of thier depth trying to do things right with probably a lot of pressures I have never felt. Given poor direction by thier boss. And ultimately left to do something critical when very tired with out the support of a senior experienced officer.

Unfortunately she made some critical errors and did not receive the kind of support and back up which would have caught those errors. She should have been better supported. The article suggests trust between members of the team was an issue.

I would not be surprised if most young women do find it tougher than most young men to be accepted in those roles. Did it play a role who knows.

He wasn’t called. According to his orders. Why not?
My guess. due to the officer who should have called him anticipating a negative reaction. Unfortunately not unusual or restricted to any particular navy or commercial operation.

It’s very poor situation when junior officers are afraid or reluctant to make call. It’s unfortunately not uncommon.
Putting a specific restriction on course deviation is not a good plan. Eg call me if deviation 1000 yards.
Might be well intentioned. Signals lack of trust. Gets interspersed as I better not deviate more than 1000 yards.

I mentioned it earlier that not all SWOs regularly stand Bridge watches, and this appears to be the case with this young woman; she was the Anti-submarine officer, which the article referred to as her "full-time job." The article also said that she had only seen this area from the bridge once before, in daytime. This is literally on the door-step of their homeport, so one has to infer that she doesn't stand a lot of Bridge watches. This may have been a case of 'assumed competence' as she was a hot-shot sub-hunter. The CO wrongly likened competence in the CIC with competence as a bridge watchkeeper. The reports repeatedly said that she disobeyed standing and night orders, and it may have been so, but I'd not be surprised if the CO hadn't given her a verbal "do what you need to do to not wake me". It was emphasized that he thought she was one of the best officers. The article mentioned that she thought the same of herself, so it may have been Dunning-Kruger effect. My impression was she was very driven, wanted to impress and didn't want to appear weak by asking for help (especially as a woman). It is somewhat telling that her first reaction in two different incidents was very much first person - "I saw my career flash before my eyes" and "I'm so f**ked" instead of concern for the ship and crew.

Note the OOD dismissing report of crystal as passing 1500 yards astern.

For two large ships doing close to 20 knots. 1500 yards would be regarded as inadequate by most large vessels. This was an intent to pass significantly less than a mile ahead of the container ship.

For the container ship this should have set off some significant level of concern much sooner.

This is very clearly the mark of a seriously inexperienced watchkeeper. I wonder if she was a "SWOS in a box" graduate? And it re-emphasizes what I've been saying, that Crystal screwed the pooch too.

[P3sailor]

I do believe this thread has lost it's way to a bunch of "arm-chair" type amateurs! While most of the threads are informative this one has long turned into a gossip session and belongs on FB or some other meaningless social media!

[kmacdonald]

It really concerns me that so many here think that operating a ship safely is a huge and complex operation. It's not. You can write books on collision avoidance loaded with acronyms and make it sound complex but determining if other ships (targets as some prefer) is a simple process that an experienced brain can determine is seconds without the help of a mile long chain of command. The ships of the USN are run like a bureaucracy and function the same, poorly.

The destroyer is like the sport boat of the fleet. The hardest to get into a collision situation and the easiest to get out of one. Just be glad we aren't building battleship any more.

Some people are saying the ship was understaffed. BS. How many merchant ships are staffed to the levels of the USN ships? The entire Naval Operations book was written by bureaucrats with no business being anywhere near the water without a life jacket on.

[SailRedemption]

As a merchant officer I find the lack of training and licensing for Naval officiers directed at standing a navigational watch. They should be trained the exact same way as commercial officiers. One person shouldn't know how to do the radar, another is trained in AIS, another with the ECIDIS software, etc. If you are an officer and are being promoted to become a navigational watch officer, they should be sent to training (and I believe this could be done in a year with competency) before they con a vessel. I find it frustrating that these officers have no bridge resource management skills and rules of the road skills, much less training on their equipment. When I get on a unfamiliar vessel with equipment that I don't know, I find a manual and at least get familiar with it.

I understand the equipment was antiquated and not fully functional, but if that's the case you wake up more sailors to post as lookouts. It takes about 5 mins to teach someone to look for lights of ships, I've done it at the maritime academy to freshman when I was a senior on the training ship. It was poor training and decision making and it started from the top.

[kmacdonald]

Originally Posted by P3sailor

I do believe this thread has lost it's way to a bunch of "arm-chair" type amateurs! While most of the threads are informative this one has long turned into a gossip session and belongs on FB or some other meaningless social media!

Welcome aboard sir.

(I thought the Navy would show up sooner or later.)

"arm-chair" type amateurs? Do you mean someone that hasn't crashed a warship?

[kmacdonald]

Originally Posted by Uricanejack

I am also mystified by Naval process and routine.
The differences are in the No of people involved in the process, how they communicate rather than the specific technicalities.
How does the team work? There are a lot more members of the team on a naval vessel and the division of tasks is diffrent.
The problem here was partly how the individuals were performing thier particular trask.
Partly how they passed on the information to the decision maker.
Overall. Who was in charge and what requirements or standard operating procedures were supposed to be along with specific Standing orders from the Capt. Ultimately the planing of the passage and specific night orders specific to the passage being conducted.
This is where the Capt dropped the Ball.

It’s often referred to as Bridge or Crew Resource Managment.

Your presumption have a lot of misunderstanding of the process for commercial vessels. Doing it by the numbers is unlikely.

Most well run ships will not use specifics, most will use general principles and allow the OOW to use good judgement.
Each situation developed uniquely. The decision point are on a well managed vessel are not specific but fluid responding to a variety of situations.

To put it very simply out in the middle of the ocean would be completely diffrent to transiting a busy TSS. Or arrival at a Pilot station.
A commercial vessel may have only 1 individual doing everything or in the case of a large Cruise ship. Possible 6 or even more in busy pilotage waters.
What might be reasonable in some situation would be quite unreasonable in others.

Who is doing what becomes important particularly who has the Con. The Navy terminology confuses me it’s clearly diffrent with 4 officers involved.

The young lady on the Bridge had what I would refer to as the watch and conduct of the vessel. Ie she is the shot caller.
She has a junior officer who she is partly training and who is giving the con.
Meanwhile down bellow there is an operations rooom with at two officers who are supposed to be providing the bridge with updates and information.
Who don’t actual have input to directing the vessel.
Which is strange to me.

This isn’t the best example for trying to figure out what they are supposed to be doing. They clearly were doing it the way it was supposed to be carried out.

Why unknown. 22 hours still on duty fatigue must have played a big role with the whole team.

I read the article. Not an investigation. But a news story. Putting names and a story to individuals.
I get the impression tiered over worked a bit out of thier depth trying to do things right with probably a lot of pressures I have never felt. Given poor direction by thier boss. And ultimately left to do something critical when very tired with out the support of a senior experienced officer.

Unfortunately she made some critical errors and did not receive the kind of support and back up which would have caught those errors. She should have been better supported. The article suggests trust between members of the team was an issue.

I would not be surprised if most young women do find it tougher than most young men to be accepted in those roles. Did it play a role who knows.

I know people died. Even so I feel sorry for the young officers on watch. They will never get over this event. Thier lives have been ruined as well.

After reading the article. My opinion.
Thier commanding officer. Overworked them for no good reason. Exhausted them beyond most industrial limits. Gave them with a poor plan to execute. With poor orders. And went to bed because he was tired. And left them to it.

He wasn’t called. According to his orders. Why not?
My guess. due to the officer who should have called him anticipating a negative reaction. Unfortunately not unusual or restricted to any particular navy or commercial operation.

It’s very poor situation when junior officers are afraid or reluctant to make call. It’s unfortunately not uncommon.
Putting a specific restriction on course deviation is not a good plan. Eg call me if deviation 1000 yards.
Might be well intentioned. Signals lack of trust. Gets interspersed as I better not deviate more than 1000 yards.

Note the OOD dismissing report of crystal as passing 1500 yards astern.

For two large ships doing close to 20 knots. 1500 yards would be regarded as inadequate by most large vessels. This was an intent to pass significantly less than a mile ahead of the container ship.

For the container ship this should have set off some significant level of concern much sooner.

Looks like you have a really good understanding of the incident. I agree nearly 100%

[jmh2002]

Originally Posted by kmacdonald

It really concerns me that so many here think that operating a ship safely is a huge and complex operation. It's not.

Totally agreed in general principle and this is part of the point that I was trying to make. There were many failures on the Fitzgerald, but the most basic one - slow down and/or turn to starboard instead of trying to pass ahead (and especially in a highly maneuverable destroyer) doesn't require any complex skills to execute (although I note that there were other vessels on the starboard side too, but hey, one thing at a time if that is all they can manage...)

Originally Posted by SailRedemption

As a merchant officer I find the lack of training and licensing for Naval officiers directed at standing a navigational watch. They should be trained the exact same way as commercial officiers.

Yes, also totally agreed and another point that I tried to make. It is both frightening and ridiculous at the same time that the OOD either didn't sufficiently know the colregs and the basic ship handling to comply with them, or was unable to implement them for fear of upsetting the Captain. In which case the OOD should not be in charge of the navigational watch in the first place.

This is all really basic stuff that an officer on the bridge should be able to do.

[kmacdonald]

The Navy has had a great deal of issues with women. Prejudicial promotion of women to positions they aren't qualified has demoralized those deserving. Just an extension of the inbreeding problem. One female captain was relieved of duty by her own crew and returned to the pentagon for her Admiral Diddy to counsel her. I heard a female officer on a warship in Buzzards Bay last summer demanded a 5 nautical mile exclusion zone around "her warship". The response brought her to tears and a male officer corrected her stupidity. Politically motivated decisions aren't the best way of conducting business.

[kmacdonald]

Originally Posted by StuM

If the catapult doesn't work, they won't tae off so hos could they land elsewhere?


How do they use the catapult when landing?

Tail hook issues.