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Auspicious · 28-10-2013, 03:22

Quote:

Originally Posted by goboatingnow

With the exception of a fake AIS messages , all the rest was either marinetraffic.com or supposition. They persistently claimed things about AIS that were factually wrong and noticeably their subsequent blogs " left" out the marine traffic stuff as its was laughable.

Which is why I think there might be a terrorism risk for a big event, but on a day to day basis it simply isn't something to worry about.

goboatingnow · 28-10-2013, 07:41

Quote:

Originally Posted by Auspicious

Which is why I think there might be a terrorism risk for a big event, but on a day to day basis it simply isn't something to worry about.

There's no real way terrorists can use AiS , how would they ships don't use AIS exclusively to make decision

Dave

Auspicious · 28-10-2013, 08:23

Quote:

Originally Posted by goboatingnow

There's no real way terrorists can use AiS , how would they ships don't use AIS exclusively to make decision

If I can think of risks so can the bad guys. I know our national security team are thinking about it. I don't think there is value in a public discussion. I'm happy to engage privately if you'd like to exchange e-mail addresses.

goboatingnow · 28-10-2013, 08:33

Quote:

Originally Posted by Auspicious

If I can think of risks so can the bad guys. I know our national security team are thinking about it. I don't think there is value in a public discussion. I'm happy to engage privately if you'd like to exchange e-mail addresses.

Huh AIS is a publically available specification. Why would you not debate it in public there is nothing secret. The Trend Micro so called " revelations" are entirely spurious because they assumes that spoofing AIS actually caused actions which in real life usage do not happen

Dave

Auspicious · 28-10-2013, 08:42

Quote:

Originally Posted by goboatingnow

Huh AIS is a publically available specification. Why would you not debate it in public there is nothing secret. The Trend Micro so called " revelations" are entirely spurious because they assumes that spoofing AIS actually caused actions which in real life usage do not happen

I had a successful career in intelligence. I know the value of creative applications of technology. I obviously won't talk about anything classified, but I also won't get into "sensitive but unclassified" where the search engines can reach it.

I guess that's a long way of saying "never mind."

goboatingnow · 28-10-2013, 09:23

Quote:

Originally Posted by Auspicious

I had a successful career in intelligence. I know the value of creative applications of technology. I obviously won't talk about anything classified, but I also won't get into "sensitive but unclassified" where the search engines can reach it.

I guess that's a long way of saying "never mind."

a proper technical discussion , as opposed to populist nonsense , on any potential issues surrounding AIS can only be of use to the greater AIS user community. As I see it , the current system is partially " spoof-able" but spoofing only works where someone actually uses the information to make critical decisions. In general AIS is not used that way

Furthermore lets look at so e supposed vulnerabilities

( a) Internet Attack , AiS is not connected to the Internet.

(B) mob spoofing , no different from voice based spoofing , spoofer has to be within VHF range and as is transmitting is a tally detectable. Since mmsi is being used a ship must be also nearby mob.

(C) appearance of a non real target , fine but ships use radar as a collision avoidance tool, that's the primary IMO and COLREGS device , hence mythical can easily be verified

(D) no ship , while claimed , I don't see how this can be achieved, while the real ship is transmitting

(E) base station control spoofing , nothing that can be done , stops AIS , data reporting intervals can be changed but not eliminated

(F) incorrect reporting of static data , again difficult to do while the original ship is also transmitting

(G) spoofer sets up land station and " creates" ship within VHF range , yes entirely possible , but easily checked by voice repose , mmsi database , radar etc.

I see no real scenario that can cause issues.

Dave

MarkJ · 28-10-2013, 09:37

AIS is being 'spoofed' legally and will increasing be be so.
The New Zealanders have made a virtual AIS channel marker in a position impossible to put a real one.

Its really an exciting development that can save our governments huge amounts of money on costly channel markers.

Already being reduced in number, physical markers can be reduced more and some (not all) replaced by virtual AIS marker.

Virtual AIS Beacon

goboatingnow · 28-10-2013, 09:46

Quote:

Originally Posted by MarkJ

AIS is being 'spoofed' legally and will increasing be be so.
The New Zealanders have made a virtual AIS channel marker in a position impossible to put a real one.

Its really an exciting development that can save our governments huge amounts of money on costly channel markers.

Already being reduced in number, physical markers can be reduced more and some (not all) replaced by virtual AIS marker.

Virtual AIS Beacon

To my understaning, virtual AIS AtoNs are not supported by the IMO. A number of races , especially the recent Americas cup has used them , but I'm sure they cannot be used to replace in-water markers. Test have been done and there are a number of trials to prove a point , but without seriously enhanced encryption, AIS can never be really used for that type of application

Dave

MarkJ · 28-10-2013, 09:57

Quote:

Originally Posted by goboatingnow

To my understaning, virtual AIS AtoNs are not supported by the IMO.
Dave

Sorry, Dave but read the link.

Quote:

DOUBTFUL SOUND GETS HIGH-TECH PROTECTION
In 2011 Vesper Marine deployed New Zealand’s first Virtual Aid to Navigation at the entrance to Doubtful Sound, a fjord in New Zealand’s South Island.

The extremely isolated and remote wilderness of New Zealand's 15,000km of coastline presents some very interesting navigational challenges to both pleasure and commercial vessels.

Environment Southland, the authority responsible for one of the most remote regions of New Zealand coastlines, needed to ensure the 80 cruise ships entering and exiting the beautiful Doubtful Sound each summer could identify a very dangerous underwater obstacle known as Tarapunga Rock. This rock lies just below the surface, close to the entrance to Doubtful Sound. Environment Southland had moored an isolated danger buoy at the rock’s location; however as the swell could exceed 7 metres at times the buoy broke up and had to be removed.

The Virtual Aid to Navigation technology that Vesper Marine has developed is based on the international standardised marine Automatic Identification System (AIS), which all large ships must use and many smaller ships are now choosing to use due to the safety and collision avoidance benefits it provides.

80 international cruise ships per years are navigating by it.

**Paul Elliott** · 28-10-2013, 09:58

Quote:

Originally Posted by goboatingnow

(D) no ship , while claimed , I don't see how this can be achieved, while the real ship is transmitting

This can be accomplished by jamming. Simple jamming would knock out all AIS traffic, but a jammer could be built that would only jam selected vessels.

I don't see the disaster in this though -- it's not much different than having a ship's transponder crap out.

goboatingnow · 28-10-2013, 10:02

Quote:

Originally Posted by MarkJ

Sorry, Dave but read the link.

80 international cruise ships per years are navigating by it.

If this is the case , it's a very dangerous use of AIS. IMHO

Dave

goboatingnow · 28-10-2013, 10:04

Quote:

Originally Posted by Paul Elliott

This can be accomplished by jamming. Simple jamming would knock out all AIS traffic, but a jammer could be built that would only jam selected vessels.

I don't see the disaster in this though -- it's not much different than having a ship's transponder crap out.

Selective jamming , with the SOTMA radio protocol is quite difficult, the jammer would have to follow the jammed ships slot assignments, if not then the ships info would appear from time to time. But as you say , no difference from just turning your transponder off

Dave

**Paul Elliott** · 28-10-2013, 10:58

Quote:

Originally Posted by goboatingnow

Selective jamming , with the SOTMA radio protocol is quite difficult, the jammer would have to follow the jammed ships slot assignments, if not then the ships info would appear from time to time. But as you say , no difference from just turning your transponder off

Dave

But that's no more difficult than the AIS slot management already being done in the Class-A transponder.

Or for that matter, all the jammer has to do is listen for the MMSI (which is the just about the first piece of data that is sent in an AIS message). Once this is heard, the jammer transmits a burst of noise which wipes out a chunk of the target AIS message. The corrupted message would be silently discarded by the AIS receivers.

Sure, you need more than a pair of pliers to build such a jammer, but we are discussing hypothetical cases here, right?

I thought the original article was pretty silly. This stuff is obvious.

As for Virtual AtoNs, I think all that needs to be done is for the authorities to monitor the AIS traffic. If they see anything out of order they can take action.

Now if the terrorists decide to spoof the GPS and AIS together, and jam the VHF channels, and shoot out the lights on our buoys and lighthouses, then we do have a problem. Next thing you know, they will be running Denial of Service attacks on the internet! Nothing left to do then but move back into our caves.