Oyster Problems?

[transmitterdan]

Originally Posted by jmaja

We have a lot of grounds and groundings here. I bet you have hard time finding a yacht here that has been sailed for a longer time (say +10 years) and has never had a structural repair due to grounding. Well there are those, but only with long keel and shallow draft. Many Swans (including S&S models), Hallberg Rassy's etc have been repaired. I don't know any Oysters around here and I have no idea what they used to be like.

This line of reasoning is why the issue is so important. Because a defect is common does not make it ok. Grounding happens and it's not ok to have damage as a result. Does damage happen? Yes it does but that does not make it ok. Damage that is nearly impossible to detect and even more difficult to repair is well and truly unacceptable. That's the take away from the MAIB report.

And now this problem (keel failure) has shown up on a high end boat. The yacht industry needs to wake up and stop saying "Oh, that happens all the time so it's just the way it has to be." It does not have to be this way. And if the industry does not deal with it more lives will be lost needlessly. The crew of PS III are lucky to be alive. If they had not survived would the industry reaction be different? I'm guessing it would. Thank the deities we don't have that situation here but next time it may not turn out so well.

[Kenomac]

Originally Posted by Steamer

To my best knowledge this 90-ft Oyster was built in Turkey.

The 90ft model along with the 825 and 885 are built in the UK. Only the 100ft and 125ft Oysters were built in Turkey, and now production of those two models has been moved back to the UK.

[Cap Erict3]

Originally Posted by transmitterdan

This line of reasoning is why the issue is so important. Because a defect is common does not make it ok. Grounding happens and it's not ok to have damage as a result. Does damage happen? Yes it does but that does not make it ok. Damage that is nearly impossible to detect and even more difficult to repair is well and truly unacceptable. That's the take away from the MAIB report.

And now this problem (keel failure) has shown up on a high end boat. The yacht industry needs to wake up and stop saying "Oh, that happens all the time so it's just the way it has to be." It does not have to be this way. And if the industry does not deal with it more lives will be lost needlessly. The crew of PS III are lucky to be alive. If they had not survived would the industry reaction be different? I'm guessing it would. Thank the deities we don't have that situation here but next time it may not turn out so well.

The potential fragility seems inherent in the design of many fin keels. Certainly hull strength at the keels attachment point should a priority but what about beyond that?






I sleep better on the hook

[Muckle Flugga]

Originally Posted by Polux

…
We are talking about a boat that was built in 3 or 4 exemplaires and about one of them having lost the keel after 1 year without ever being grounded and having the keel bolts tighten by Oyster 6 months ago.

It is not the same thing, not by a long shot.

So… what of your words on the sinking of the brand new Beneteau 55 on its maiden voyage (on this thread: http://www.cruisersforum.com/forums/...43799-3.html)? What of Beneteau's response to that?

Originally Posted by Polux

...
Beneteau USA should take all the efforts to bring the boat to a port. if it is still afloat it seems not difficult to me, if the conditions are not bad: Just one or two big gasoline water pumps and they probably will be able to sail the boat to port. Determining what really happened should be very important to Beneteau.
...

You didn't seem to think it was so very different then? And what was Beneteau's response? Seems to me it was the same as it always is: nothing, zip, nada, no comment, no investigation, no interest and no follow up.

Meanwhile after a single major failure in its circa 40 year history, which occurred when the new management decided to start employing design features more common to the likes of Beneteau, Oyster engages in what appears to be a comprehensive review of the case, and is prompted by a single thread on CF to make a public statement which goes a long way to admitting responsibility with reference to the build, if not yet the design. I do not think Oyster has gone far enough, yet, but it is one hell of a lot better than the total lack of any interest whatsoever in the MANY complete hull failures of Beneteaus over the years, including, it would appear, this brand spanking new example which foundered on its maiden voyage. Or are you aware of any attempt on the part of Beneteau to establish what occurred, in any such cases? You did call for it yourself, after all.

[Jon Eisberg]

Originally Posted by Muckle Flugga

And the different story has been that this manufacturer has made a statement going better than halfway to admitting responsibility, as well as demonstrating committment to fixing any issues which have arisen therefrom. Oyster has demonstrated a commitment to its owners, even those who have purchased their craft at 5th and 6th or more hand, 25 or 30 years after initial sale, which puts them in an entirely different category of service to Beneteau, which, as you correctly suggest (perhaps without meaning to!) appears to wash its hands of any responsibiility for or interest in its craft as soon as they are out of the saleroom, and certainly as soon as they are no longer defineable as "brand new".

Perhaps a better comparison than to the loss of CHEEKI RAFIKI, might be the sinking last March of a brand-new Beneteau 55 off Monterey, CA, while being delivered by a professional crew to the Strictly Sail boat show in Oakland...

Lots of speculation about the cause, the most likely culprit appears to have been a failure of the bow thruster tunnel, admitting a massive amount of water in a jiffy...

However, to the best of my knowledge, no one ever heard a peep out of Beneteau in the aftermath of that one...

[Muckle Flugga]

Originally Posted by Jon Eisberg

Perhaps a better comparison than to the loss of CHEEKI RAFIKI, might be the sinking last March of a brand-new Beneteau 55 off Monterey, CA, while being delivered by a professional crew to the Strictly Sail boat show in Oakland...

Lots of speculation about the cause, the most likely culprit appears to have been a failure of the bow thruster tunnel, admitting a massive amount of water in a jiffy...

However, to the best of my knowledge, no one ever heard a peep out of Beneteau in the aftermath of that one...

My thoughts exactly. I referenced it in the post directly before yours. But precisely. Those defending Beneteau should answer that one, and Bene should begin to care at least slightly about the fact that plenty of its boats have simply broken up and sunk while sailing normally. I haven't heard of any interest from them on the matter, frankly whatsoever, in any of these cases, even when they are fatal.

[Muckle Flugga]

Originally Posted by jmaja

It was the MAIB report that called it matrix detachment. Delamination is something else.

Commonly delamination in sailing refers to the debonding of layers within a laminate of a single stiffening substance, such as fiberglass layers within a single layup. However I think you sould look up the definition of "laminate". Many and even most laminates are bonded layers of dissimilar materials, or materials with differing structural properties. It's kinda the point.

[jmaja]

Originally Posted by neilpride

Both boats have something in common, they have catastrophic keel failures, both with a weak point in the construction , if you don't see the weakness in the 40,7 you are blind, honestly if you cant even touch the ground with the 40,7 at the risk to break the glue between the hull and the grid liner then the boat is weak.... througbolting a slim keel to a hollow thin grid liner is just playing dumb.....

I guess the writers of the MAIB report are blind then? They didn't blaim Beneteau for the design and construction, but they did blaim the attitude towards "light" groundings and how repairs are not done at all or not thoroughly done.

I'm not saying that 40.7 is good example of how to build keel structure and I have never owned a Beneteau. But I do think it is within the common standards required and it has proven to be strong enough as long as you repair it after groundings causing damage.

Since people want good performance of the deep and short keels and boats have potential to reach double digit speeds, it is impossible to build boats that could survive all groundings without structural damage and still have this potential.

The most surprising thing to me was from the MAIB report that the rather common attitude seems to be that no inspection or repair is needed after a "light" grounding. And even for a professionally driven rental boat! Around here (Finland) I haven't heard of shuch an attitude. We have a tradition of building strong boats, but still everybody knows to inspect the structure after groundings and expect that some damage may have occured. Certainly Beneteaus need repairing more often than local made boats. Unfortunately boats made around here became very expensive and not many are made now.

I don't see much difference in a car accident and a boat grounding. The purpose in both is to keep the passangers safe, which inculedes keeping water out and keel in place for boats. Neither is expected to be damage free nor to survive another accident before being repaired.

[neilpride]

Originally Posted by jmaja

I guess the writers of the MAIB report are blind then? They didn't blaim Beneteau for the design and construction, but they did blaim the attitude towards "light" groundings and how repairs are not done at all or not thoroughly done.

I'm not saying that 40.7 is good example of how to build keel structure and I have never owned a Beneteau. But I do think it is within the common standards required and it has proven to be strong enough as long as you repair it after groundings causing damage.

Since people want good performance of the deep and short keels and boats have potential to reach double digit speeds, it is impossible to build boats that could survive all groundings without structural damage and still have this potential.

The most surprising thing to me was from the MAIB report that the rather common attitude seems to be that no inspection or repair is needed after a "light" grounding. And even for a professionally driven rental boat! Around here (Finland) I haven't heard of shuch an attitude. We have a tradition of building strong boats, but still everybody knows to inspect the structure after groundings and expect that some damage may have occured. Certainly Beneteaus need repairing more often than local made boats. Unfortunately boats made around here became very expensive and not many are made now.

I don't see much difference in a car accident and a boat grounding. The purpose in both is to keep the passangers safe, which inculedes keeping water out and keel in place for boats. Neither is expected to be damage free nor to survive another accident before being repaired.

No, MAIB in my opinion do a good job with the report, but seems to me that folks like you don't want to see the obvious, by ignorance my 2 cents, or by lack of basic boat construction knowledge,,,, lets see if you get this,, and this don't come from any MAIB report, a long and narrow keel bolted to a flat surface , in this case a thin hull shell supported with a hollow thin grid liner with no strong structure at all around the keel or mast is a disaster waiting to happen.. that's all, if you want to get numbers just flow around boatyards and you can get a picture of how many 40,7 are making repairs in the keel area, yes yes , any vessel after repeated groundings need inspections and repairs but if the groundings compromise the structure to the point that make the vessel dangerous and unseaworthy then the boat in question is good for coastal sailing....

From the MAIB report..

During the course of the investigation, the MAIB received much anecdotal evidence regarding matrix detachments on Beneteau First 40.7 yachts. Areas notable for detachment were in the forward sections of the matrix, commonly attributed to the vessel slamming, and the area around and aft of where the keel is attached to the hull, commonly attributed to the vessel grounding.
MAIB inspectors visited four Beneteau First 40.7 yachts that had all suffered detachments of their matrix in bays around the aft end of the keel as a result of grounding. Additionally, two of these vessels had suffered, or were showing signs of, matrix detachment in the forward section.
One further Beneteau First 40.7 yacht was visited, which showed signs of matrix detachment in the forward and aft sections.

Obviously they mention vessel slamming, those 40,7 bang really well to windward year after year,,,, basic mechanics of a grounding, the aft keel edge transmit the shock load and compress really hard the aft part of the hull with a bending sceneario of the whole inner structure , the fwd keel make the opposite,, mix this with a brittle glue used to bond the liner to the hull and?? because Plexus don't flex to those extremes and break or fail even with a light grounding... with a liner detached and unnoticed from the hull shell you get a Bomb! and is hard to detect without expensive termal tooling, so to me this whole thing sounds to a weak structure and a way to make your life miserable on board of a 40,7...

Now if I spend 6 millions euros in a 90 ft expensive yacht and the boat cant survive a regular grounding , then what? or wait, lets see how 60 tones of boat can smash 15 mm of keel stub in a grounding,,, they are really lucky it happen in shallow waters and close to shore, you see why Rafiki and Polina have something in common?

[jmaja]

Originally Posted by neilpride

No, MAIB in my opinion do a good job with the report, but seems to me that folks like you don't want to see the obvious, by ignorance my 2 cents, or by lack of basic boat construction knowledge,,,, lets see if you get this,, and this don't come from any MAIB report, a long and narrow keel bolted to a flat surface , in this case a thin hull shell supported with a hollow thin grid liner with no strong structure at all around the keel or mast is a disaster waiting to happen..

According to the Wolfston unit report (Annex C in the MAIB report) 40.7 fullfilled the ISO 12215-9 requirements except for the keel bolt washer plates, which would have needed to be 3 mm thicker and 3 mm wider. At the time 40.7 was designed this standard wasn't used, but still it easily fullfilled it with most of the structure.

So basically you are saying that people who have developed ISO 12215-9 and Farr Yacht Design have lack of basic boat construction knowledge?

So lets go to much earlier "standards" by David Gerr in the Elementh of Boat Strenght, which is regarded as very safe by most. First 40.7 has a scantling number of 2.7. Thus it should have lower topside shell laminate of 9 mm and keel area laminate of 13 mm. The floors and stringers should be cored and have 6 mm laminate thickness.

According to Wolfston unit report the hull shell laminate was 7.7 mm and the matrix laminate was 10.5 mm thick. So comparing to Gerr's requirement hull shell laminate is thin, but the matrix laminate is not. Although it is hard to compare the cored floors and stringers by Gerr to the hollow ones in 40.7. Without looking into details I would think that the 70% thicker laminate would compensate for the lack of core and that is basically also what the Wolfston unit found out.

Then the 7.7 shell laminate does sound thin. But with the whole keel structure area covered with the matrix, it can be seen as 18.2 mm as well, which would be much more than required be Gerr.

It becomes more challenging to think what happens when the matrix is detached, but still held in place by compression from keel bolts. I think that wouldn't be a fatal problem in short term, but may cause fatigue and problems in longer term.

What then happened when Cheeki Rafiki was repaired without removing the keel on thus probably also the keel bolt washer plates. I would think that the water tightness of the hull keel interface was compromised possibly allowing corrosion of the keel bolts. Also the keel bolts where no longer compressing the matrix in the same manner, since matrix was repaired without laminating below the bolt washers. Thus the the matrix below the washers was only glued to the rest of the matrix.

[transmitterdan]

Originally Posted by jmaja

I guess the writers of the MAIB report are blind then? They didn't blaim Beneteau for the design and construction, but they did blaim the attitude towards "light" groundings and how repairs are not done at all or not thoroughly done.

At the beginning of the MAIB report they clearly laid out the goals of the investigation and report. They said that assigning blame was not within the scope of their investigation. That they did not blame anyone is therefore understandable.

The report recommended that the industry and manufacturers agree on an inspection and repair strategy. It also recommended that for pretty much any grounding where the boat stopped or had discernible deceleration an out of water inspection be performed per the agreed method and done ASAP after grounding. The report makes it pretty easy to figure what parties to blame for that disturbing state of affairs.

[neilpride]

Originally Posted by jmaja

According to the Wolfston unit report (Annex C in the MAIB report) 40.7 fullfilled the ISO 12215-9 requirements except for the keel bolt washer plates, which would have needed to be 3 mm thicker and 3 mm wider. At the time 40.7 was designed this standard wasn't used, but still it easily fullfilled it with most of the structure.

So basically you are saying that people who have developed ISO 12215-9 and Farr Yacht Design have lack of basic boat construction knowledge?

So lets go to much earlier "standards" by David Gerr in the Elementh of Boat Strenght, which is regarded as very safe by most. First 40.7 has a scantling number of 2.7. Thus it should have lower topside shell laminate of 9 mm and keel area laminate of 13 mm. The floors and stringers should be cored and have 6 mm laminate thickness.

According to Wolfston unit report the hull shell laminate was 7.7 mm and the matrix laminate was 10.5 mm thick. So comparing to Gerr's requirement hull shell laminate is thin, but the matrix laminate is not. Although it is hard to compare the cored floors and stringers by Gerr to the hollow ones in 40.7. Without looking into details I would think that the 70% thicker laminate would compensate for the lack of core and that is basically also what the Wolfston unit found out.

Then the 7.7 shell laminate does sound thin. But with the whole keel structure area covered with the matrix, it can be seen as 18.2 mm as well, which would be much more than required be Gerr.

It becomes more challenging to think what happens when the matrix is detached, but still held in place by compression from keel bolts. I think that wouldn't be a fatal problem in short term, but may cause fatigue and problems in longer term.

What then happened when Cheeki Rafiki was repaired without removing the keel on thus probably also the keel bolt washer plates. I would think that the water tightness of the hull keel interface was compromised possibly allowing corrosion of the keel bolts. Also the keel bolts where no longer compressing the matrix in the same manner, since matrix was repaired without laminating below the bolt washers. Thus the the matrix below the washers was only glued to the rest of the matrix.

No offense but the ISO 12215-9 is still empty of context, and Farr yacht design I guess have been screwed by Beneteau since I doubt very much Farr have any control of the construction process , I mean my 2 cents the grid liner is designed and build in house , Beneteau,, maybe I'm wrong ...

The floors and stringers in the 40,7 are hollow, 18 mm of total thicknes yes, but you need to consider that those extra mm coming from the grid are acting like a huge washer or backing plate, if they keep they integrity then ok, the problem is when is detached from the hull shell , and if you see again the pics of a 40,7 bilge sump you can even notice that most keel bolts are no tied to the structure, instead bolted flat and in some bolts at the grid flange.... just figurate.....

[Polux]

Originally Posted by transmitterdan

This line of reasoning is why the issue is so important. Because a defect is common does not make it ok. Grounding happens and it's not ok to have damage as a result. Does damage happen? Yes it does but that does not make it ok. Damage that is nearly impossible to detect and even more difficult to repair is well and truly unacceptable. That's the take away from the MAIB report.
..

I agree that something should be improved regarding a System where damage is difficult to detect...or regarding the system or regarding the builder offering technological means (through the dealers) to make the check up available, even if expensive.

But I do not agree that hard groundings are common...unless the sailor is not a good or careful one. Done many miles without any hard grounding and I have friends that have made as many or more miles than me without hard groundings too.

But I fail to understand what the First 40.7 that has to do with the Oyster 825/90 case were no grounding happened and that on the 3 or 4 boats built, in about a year, one of them lost the keel, after having been checked up by Oyster (after complaints), being the keel bolts tightened by the manufacturer.

On the First 40.7 we are talking about 600 sailboats with many having been sailed and raced in very hard conditions on the last 10 years, some even circumnavigate, with two losing the keel due to not having being properly repaired after being grounded several times and also after a proper maintenance not being made regarding tightening the keel bolts.

Clearly not the same thing, not in what regards the circumstances (grounding or not), neither in what concerns the percentage regarding the number of boats, neither regarding the time it took to happen, neither regarding the boats having been properly maintained or repaired.

Since this is not clearly a similar case I would suggest that the ones that want to post regarding the First 40.7 do so on the thread that is about it leaving this one for the Oyster keel/structure problem.

[Polux]

Originally Posted by Jon Eisberg

Perhaps a better comparison than to the loss of CHEEKI RAFIKI, might be the sinking last March of a brand-new Beneteau 55 off Monterey, CA, while being delivered by a professional crew to the Strictly Sail boat show in Oakland...

Lots of speculation about the cause, the most likely culprit appears to have been a failure of the bow thruster tunnel, admitting a massive amount of water in a jiffy...

However, to the best of my knowledge, no one ever heard a peep out of Beneteau in the aftermath of that one...

Yes , I agree with you even if the case is only similar in what regards a (possible?) catastrophic failure, since they are clearly different.

In what regards the Beneteau 55 we don't know what happened but even so a different case since many Beneteaus 55 have been produced and not any other accident was registered on new boats, not on the 55 not on other many recent similar Beneteaus.

I would say that a defect in building is, regarding the Beneteau 55, the more probable cause while on the Oyster the more probable cause is a design problem connected with a defective production method, at least it is what I understood from the somewhat confusing explanations Oyster gives.

Oyster assumed that the boats had a problem, Oysters 825 were called in and reinforced. That did not happen with Beneteau were the many 55 were not called in neither reinforced.

I agree however that consumers should have the right to be informed regarding what happened on cases like these and a mandatory independent investigation should always take place. The problem here is who should investigate that? Who is going to pay for that?

[poiu]

Originally Posted by Polux

I agree that something should be improved regarding a System where damage is difficult to detect...or regarding the system or regarding the builder offering technological means (through the dealers) to make the check up available, even if expensive.

But I do not agree that hard groundings are common...unless the sailor is not a good or careful one. Done many miles without any hard grounding and I have friends that have made as many or more miles than me without hard groundings too.

But I fail to understand what the First 40.7 that has to do with the Oyster 825/90 case were no grounding happened and that on the 3 or 4 boats built, in about a year, one of them lost the keel, after having been checked up by Oyster (after complaints), being the keel bolts tightened by the manufacturer.

On the First 40.7 we are talking about 600 sailboats with many having been sailed and raced in very hard conditions on the last 10 years, some even circumnavigate, with two losing the keel due to not having being properly repaired after being grounded several times and also after a proper maintenance not being made regarding tightening the keel bolts.

Clearly not the same thing, not in what regards the circumstances (grounding or not), neither in what concerns the percentage regarding the number of boats, neither regarding the time it took to happen, neither regarding the boats having been properly maintained or repaired.

Since this is not clearly a similar case I would suggest that the ones that want to post regarding the First 40.7 do so on the thread that is about it leaving this one for the Oyster keel/structure problem.

I think you are missing the point, that both keels are the exact same thing in the most essential, relevant sense. They are both bad and dangerous designs.